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1. Overview  
Conflict profile 
Threats to peace and security in North Eastern Kenya are closely linked to legacies of state 
violence and marginalisation (Lind et al., 2017; NCIC & Interpeace, 2017). This report focuses on 
three counties in the North East: Garissa, Mandera and Wajir. Historical injustices, neglect and 
repressive state policies have led to the political and economic marginalisation of the North East 
region and its underdevelopment. State security forces used indiscriminate violence against the 
local Somali population during 1964-1967 in the name of ‘collective responsibility’ for the shifta 
insurgency. Although the conflict officially came to an end in 1967, state-sponsored violence and 
intimidation continued against Somali residents. Political liberalisation in the 1990s contributed to 
a new context for violent conflict in North Eastern Kenya, in the form of clan conflict and 
competition over scarce resources (Chome, 2019). At the same time, initiatives in Wajir, Garissa 
and Mandera aimed at clan accommodation and conflict resolution proved successful in 
stemming violence. Widespread violence following Kenya’s 2007 general election results 
highlighted the country’s troubled internal divisions. It also revealed the continued success of 
peace infrastructures in the North East, which remained largely free of post-election violence 
(Nolasco, 2017; Lind et al., 2015; Menkhaus, 2015).  
While devolution, introduced in the 2010 Constitution, has begun to pivotally redress the state’s 
neglect and historic marginalisation of pastoral areas in the North, the influence of al-Shabaab, 
the Somalia-based militant organisation, is a key driver in the rise in violence. Much of the 
increase in conflict is seen in Kenya’s North Eastern counties (Lind, 2018). Devolution appears 
over time to have helped to undercut support for al-Shabaab in the North East, while at the same 
time producing greater competition among clans and elites for local government posts and 
economic resources (ICG, 2018). Al-Shabaab has, in turn, sought to exploit clan disputes and 
clan dynamics to foster insecurity and advance their operations and activities in Kenya 
(Mohamed & Warfa, 2019; Sahgal et al., 2019; ICG, 2018). There has been a spike in militant 
activity in recent months, which could be further exacerbated by the impact of the COVID-19 
pandemic. The socio-economic hardships caused by efforts to contain COVID-19 and the 
allocation of resources away from countering extremism to containing the pandemic can 
contribute to an enabling environment for militant activity (Mohamed, et al., 2020). 
Root causes of conflict 
Elite power struggles, identity politics and political exclusion: One of the most potent drivers of 
conflict in Kenya is the persistence of a system of political patronage, often along ethnic lines 
(Nolasco, 2017; Cox et al., 2014). In the North East of Kenya, identity politics are central to 
Kenya-Somalia border conflicts. Influential Somali clan members, such as political leaders, often 
manipulate Somali clan identities and existing cleavages in their pursuit of power and control of 
resources (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017; Nolasco, 2017). Devolution has resulted in the 
entrenchment of ‘winner-takes-all’ ethnic politics at the county level. Vulnerabilities of populations 
in the North East of Kenya under the prior centralised system now centres upon minority clans 
within counties (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017). 
Weak social contract: Threats to peace and security in the North East arise in part from a long 
trajectory of problematic state-society (or state-citizen) relations between the Kenyan state and 
ethnic Somalis (Lind et al., 2017). The state has not only neglected the region, it has also 
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committed atrocities in the North East, which has made relationships between the communities 
and state deeply problematic (Lind, 2018; Lind et al., 2017; Kochore, 2016; Carrier & Kochore, 
2014). How the Kenyan state has historically viewed and treated the ethnic Somali population 
has contributed to the ‘othering’ of Kenyan Somali citizens, putting their lived experience of 
citizenship and equality of rights at risk (Lind et al., 2015). Even as Kenyan Somalis have 
become a stronger part of political and economic spheres, they remain marginalised in terms of 
citizenship recognition and ability to gain access to national identity documents (Scharrer, 2018). 
Regional inequality, exclusion and marginalisation: The threat to peace and security in the North 
East is strongly tied to entrenched forms of political and economic marginalisation, exclusion and 
inequality (Lind et al., 2017). The region has long experienced the highest levels of poverty and 
underdevelopment in the country, contributing to crime and insecurity (Nolasco, 2017). Garissa, 
Wajir and Mandera are among the seven poorest of Kenya’s 47 counties, with poverty levels of 
66%, 63% and 78%, respectively, compared to 36% across the country (Abdille, 2019). The 
North East has the greatest concentration of pastoral communities in the country and there is a 
strong perception among these communities that the government has treated them unfairly, 
signifying a high level of local alienation from the government (Menkhaus, 2015). The region lags 
behind the rest of the country in infrastructure, education and health services, with Northern 
Kenyan counties ranking at the bottom of almost every human development ranking in the 
country (Abdille, 2019; Menkhaus, 2015). 
Resource and environmental factors: Competition for the control of political and economic 
resources in Northern Kenya – and unequal access to land and natural resources – are 
considered to be drivers of recurrent violence and key threats to security (Botha & Abdile, 2020; 
Whittaker, 2017). The weaker socio-economic situation in these arid and semi-arid Northern 
regions means that climate shocks and stresses, especially drought, normally have greater 
consequences, such as acute food shortages (Njoka et al., 2016). Pastoral conflicts have 
become more frequent and unpredictable, exacerbated by scarce resources, and have 
increasingly involved the use of arms (Njoka et al., 2016; Witsenburg & Adano, 2009). In 
addition, deep-rooted inequalities persist in areas where oil and hydrocarbon reserves are 
located, which makes the way in which anticipated revenues are shared of particular importance 
as a potential source of conflict or resilience (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017; Vasquez, 2013). 
Conflict dynamics 
Cross-border conflict dynamics: Poor security and porous borders in the North and North East of 
Kenya have produced a complex set of conflict dynamics. It is considered to have contributed to 
the proliferation of small arms in the region and illicit trade in cattle; and enabled the expansion of 
al-Shabaab activities (Nolasco, 2017). Growing scarcity of water and grazing land has also 
contributed to conflicts across county boundaries (Wakube et al., 2017). Cross-border clan 
identities play a significant role in conflict dynamics and conflict spillover between countries and 
counties (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017). Loyalty to one’s clan is used at times by powerful 
individuals and groups to mobilise individual clans against other clans, and in some cases even 
among sub-clans of the same clan (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017).  
Devolution dynamics: The outcomes of devolution have thus far been mixed. Benefits include a 
strong counterbalance to the centre, greater political power to Kenyan Somalis, and much larger 
resource allocation to marginalised areas (Cannon & Ali, 2018). Devolution has brought national 
resources closer to the people, while also intensifying local rivalries and inter-clan competition for 
political seats - perceived as guaranteed access to economic resources by ‘winning’ clans to the 
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disadvantage of ‘losing’ clans (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017; Carrier & Kochore, 2014). The 
persistent ethnicisation of politics, now also at the county level, has undermined the intent of 
devolution to accommodate different interest groupings and address marginalisation as important 
drivers of political violence (Lind, 2018; Carrier & Kochore, 2014). Previously marginalised 
groups at the national level have come to dominate at the county level, which has led in some 
cases to the marginalisation of minority clans within the county – and the potential for new 
conflict (Lind, 2018; NCIC & Interpeace, 2017; Mkutu et al., 2014). Greater levels of corruption at 
the local level is another unintended consequence of devolution (Cannon & Ali, 2018; Lind, 
2018). 
Hate speech: Incitement by politicians, local elites and mainstream and community media is a 
key feature in the majority of prior conflicts in Kenya, contributing to the escalation of tensions 
(Nolasco, 2017). Despite progress in countering hate speech, spear-headed in large part by the 
National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC), politics in Kenya remains divided along 
ethnic lines (Nolasco, 2017). Hate speech has been less prevalent in the North than in the rest of 
the country, but there are still reports of politicians inciting clans with abusive and derogatory 
statements about rival clans, for example in Mandera County (Mohamed & Warfa, 2019). 
Security issues: Communities in the North East of Kenya have low levels of trust in security 
institutions due to inadequate provision of security services; alleged police corruption; and a 
history of heavy-handed security operations and atrocities committed against residents of the 
region (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017; International Alert, 2016). Alongside, the blanket suspicion of 
local communities inhibits the ability of security officials to effectively secure the community and 
the willingness of residents to provide information (Botha & Abdile, 2020; NCIC & Interpeace, 
2017). Alleged corruption in the National Police Force and the Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) are 
considered an ‘enabler’ for extremism (Mongare, 2019). It is reported, for example, that police 
corruption at the border has allowed for al-Shabaab to gain entry into Kenya and to smuggle in 
illegal goods, such as sugar; and that the KDF have acted as brokers in the illegal trade of 
charcoal (Mongare, 2019). Such corruption, inadequate policies and capacities of security 
agencies, and poor coordination among them, have heightened insecurity. Small arms availability 
and misuse further exacerbate security problems, increasing the potential or violence. 
Radicalisation and violent extremism: While al-Shabaab remains focused on enforcing its variant 
of Islamic law in Somalia, it has drawn upon Kenya’s internal tensions and divisions to garner 
support (Lind et al., 2017). Long-standing injustices and poor relations with the police, racial 
profiling and lack of belonging, can fuel radicalisation and violent extremism (Kirui, 2019; Mkutu 
et al., 2014; Botha, 2013). A key threat to stability in Kenya is if extremists succeed in dividing 
Muslims and non-Muslims, which has materialised to some extent following various attacks 
targeting Christians (Anderson & McKnight, 2015; Botha, 2013). Youth unemployment and lack 
of sustainable livelihood opportunities are key challenges perceived to contribute to their 
recruitment into al-Shabaab, which reportedly offers some form of economic or social good as an 
incentive to join (Anderson & McKnight, 2015; Mkutu et al., 2014). The various attacks committed 
by al-Shabaab in the North East have also prompted an exodus of civil servants, with a 
disastrous effect on services (HFTT, 2015; ICG, 2015). In addition, there is some emergent 
research that finds a complex relationship between al-Shabaab and clan conflicts, in which the 
extremist group exploits clan competition and the marginalisation of minority clans, to advance 
their operations in Kenya (Karienye & Warfa, 2020; Mohamed & Warfa, 2019; Sahgal et al., 
2019). The securitisation of the government’s response to violent extremism, and indiscriminate 
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targeting of its own Somali population, has also had the counter-productive outcome of fuelling 
radicalisation (Botha & Abdile, 2020; Chome, 2019; Lind et al., 2017). 
Sources of resilience 
Sources of resilience and resilience actors can be double-edged, contributing to peace and to 
insecurity. Devolution, for example, remains an important source of resilience although it has 
also exacerbated clan conflicts. Similarly, elders have been effective at peace-making, while at 
other times they have contributed to violence through their staunch support of particular clans. 
Devolution, constitutional reform and local government: The devolution of powers and resources 
to sub-national county governments remains one of the most promising ways in which to prevent 
conflict in the North East (Lind et al., 2015). The establishment of county-level administrations 
responsible for spending a significant proportion of government funds has enabled the expansion 
of the state-building process into previously marginalised areas of the country (Mosley & Watson, 
2016). North Eastern Kenya also moved from the political periphery to being of national 
importance in the 2013 elections; and the ascent of Kenyan Somalis to top positions in the 
Kenyan government raises the prospect of shedding their ‘outsider’ tag (Kirui, 2019; Carrier & 
Kochore, 2014; Menkhaus, 2015). Locally elected officials in county government, with better local 
knowledge and greater local legitimacy than politicians from other counties, are also well placed 
to address conflicts and promote peace (Menkhaus, 2015; Mkutu et al., 2014). County elites 
need to be more inclusive of minorities, cooperate across local boundaries for inter-county peace 
and recognise the continued role for neutral national institutions (ICG, 2015). 
Citizenship, social cohesion and social contract: The attention of Kenya’s governing elite has 
shifted increasingly to the economic potential of the Northern regions. Infrastructure, such as 
roads that connect regions to the centre, can alter not only development opportunities for 
populations in the North, but also their identities and a sense of belonging to the nation (Kochore, 
2016). Alongside infrastructure and security, national and county governments need to urgently 
re-establish social services in the North, especially health and education.  
Resilience factors that bring different communities together include the creation of new narratives 
of collaboration and Kenyan citizenship through joint local initiatives to achieve mutual goals and 
practical help (International Alert, 2016). Shared public spaces, such as markets, schools, and 
hospitals, can foster unity. The effective functioning of these facilities is considered to be one of 
the most important issues that brings different clans together (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017). 
Guaranteeing equal citizenship rights for all Kenyans, such as through the fair issuance of 
identity documents, is a fundamental component of a wider peacebuilding approach that could 
ameliorate state–society and inter-community tensions (Scharrer, 2018; Lind et al., 2017; 
International Alert, 2016).  
Strengthened security arrangements and police-civilian trust: Building trust, which can enable 
effective partnerships between the police and the public, is fundamental to conflict prevention 
and peacebuilding in North East Kenya (Botha & Abdile, 2020; Nolasco, 2017; Mkutu et al., 
2014; USAID et al., 2013). It requires security forces to reduce their use of aggressive tactics; 
and to be better rooted in local communities (Botha & Abdile, 2020; ICG, 2018; International 
Alert, 2016). The deployment of local, Muslim, ethnic Somali security officials to lead operations 
in the North East is reported to have built trust in the security services as residents see locally 
rooted offices as more responsive to their concerns (ICG, 2018). Community policing, 
neighbourhood watch schemes and other early warning mechanisms can also be effective in 
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improving levels of trust between communities and the police. Improved relationship and trust-
building can, in turn, facilitate information gathering and the early detection of extremist activity 
and other criminal acts (Botha & Abdile, 2020; ICG, 2018; Nolasco, 2017).  
Programmes to counter violent extremism in Kenya have moved away from a securitised 
response, expanding to include interventions aimed at addressing historical grievances and the 
environment conducive to extremist ideologies and recruitment (Botha & Abdile, 2020; ICG, 
2018; Nolasco, 2017). Efforts also need to be made to challenge particular perceptions of groups 
and treatment of all Muslims as terrorists or views of Christians as the enemy (Botha, 2013). 
Creating the space for engagement and dialogue between youth and the police, in contrast to 
confrontation, is particularly important as youth can be vulnerable to recruitment into extremism 
(Pact & Mercy Corps, 2018). Police forces also need to be representative and reflective of 
women and their needs, which includes efforts to improve women and girls’ awareness of their 
rights and on reporting violence against women and girls (VAWG) to the police (Beston, 2018).  
Transitional justice: Investigation of the Wagalla massacre, and also the wider impact of the 
shifta war, formed a major element of the work of Kenya’s Truth, Justice and Reconciliation 
Commission of Kenya (TJRC), however, lack of acknowledgement by state actors undermines 
the important findings of state culpability (Anderson, 2014). Progress toward implementing the 
TJRC report and acknowledgement by political elites of past atrocities against the Somali 
population detailed in the report, could play a significant role in addressing historical injustices 
(Kirui, 2019; Nolasco, 2017). Other actors have made efforts to achieve some form of 
acknowledgement, such as the public monument to the victims of the Wagalla massacre, 
supported by the Kenya National Commission for Human Rights (Anderson, 2014). 
Peace Committees (PCs): PCs have been prominent in historically marginalised peripheral 
border areas, playing a pivotal role in coordinating information and interventions to address 
conflict and serving as a mechanism for cooperation, trust and relationship building (USAID et 
al., 2013). District PCs have been vastly inclusive and have played a central role in managing 
ethno-political violence at the local level (Nolasco, 2017; Menkhaus, 2008). They can also spawn 
strong and beneficial spill-over effects, in which one successful PC is emulated in other districts 
and regions and across the border; and also at local levels (Nolasco, 2017; USAID et al., 2013). 
Local PCs have worked successfully with local administration authorities from Kenya, Somalia, 
Ethiopia and Uganda, who routinely meet at the border to discuss conflicts and coordinate with 
state security forces in the areas (Nolasco, 2017; USAID et al., 2013). While PCs are proven, 
effective sources of resilience, conflict management and peacebuilding in Kenya, they face 
various critiques and challenges, including inadequate participation of women and inability to 
address root causes. PCs have also been undermined by divisive clan interests and by neglect 
by new county leaders under devolution (USAID et al., 2013). 
Traditional elders and Council of Elders (CoEs): Traditional elders and CoEs have played an 
effective role in enforcing peace initiatives and agreements and managing conflict in Northern 
Kenya (Nyamweru & Chidongo, 2018; Nolasco, 2017). One of their key benefits may lie in 
providing an entry point for other actors to engage in dialogue and to anchor infrastructures for 
peace (NCIC, 2018). Elders and CoEs may represent larger descent groups, sub-clans and 
clans, with very few of Kenya’s CoE claiming an identity that transcends ethnicity, rendering them 
susceptible to clan politics (Nyamweru & Chidongo, 2018). CoEs played a prominent role in 
mobilising voters along ethnic and clan lines during the 2013 elections in Northern Kenya (Carrier 
& Kochore, 2014). In some places, strained relations between youth and community elders, and 
neglect of women, can undermine peace efforts, requiring more efforts to bridge the groups. 
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CoEs in Kenya have rarely supported a female candidate for any national position and have even 
intervened to discourage women from running (Nyabola, 2016). There are indications, however, 
that some local elder groups show signs of evolving to include younger people and women in 
their membership (Nyamweru & Chidongo, 2018).  
Religious leaders and inter-faith dialogue: Customary and religious leaders continue to play a key 
role in influencing the attitudes and behaviours of communities, particularly remote, pastoral 
communities, benefitting from continued legitimacy and authority amongst such communities 
(Pact & Mercy Corps, 2018). Local religious leaders have successfully engaged in conflict 
mediation, leading to the development of permanent peace dialogue mechanisms, involved in 
addressing cross-border conflict, violent extremism and VAWG. Strategies to counter violence 
and extremism include engaging more consistently with both Christian and Muslim religious 
leaders as a way to counter divisive narratives that fuel inter-communal tensions (International 
Alert, 2016). Inter-faith dialogue should take place not only among religious leaders and their 
partners, but also at the community level and in the educational system – which has traditionally 
offered segmented religious education (Wesonga, 2017). 
Media: Kenya’s vibrant and dynamic media, with several community and faith-based radio 
stations with a fairly large following across the country, has the potential to contribute to conflict 
prevention and peacebuilding (Maweu, 2019). This can be through the portrayal of promising 
potentials; and the promotion of dialogue and understanding among conflicting communities – 
through dramas, storytelling, and call-in talk shows (Maweu, 2019). Wajir Community Radio, 
which provides the community, particularly herders, with climate information, also serves as a 
platform for local communities to raise grievances and or policy-makers to take part in the 
dialogue (Mercy Corps, 2019; Sladkova, 2019). Community-based media in Kenya face various 
challenges, however, in particular lack of funding and reliance on donors (Maweu, 2019). 
Business: The dramatic expansion of cross-border commerce from Somalia into Kenya has had 
a variable effect on cross-border conflict, often serving as a force for cross-clan collaboration and 
security, but also producing conflict over control of key trade routes (Nolasco, 2017). Cross-
border trade has produced a network of regional business elites whose partnerships and 
business interests cut across clan lines, providing the potential for inclusive collaboration (NCIC 
& Interpeace, 2017; Menkhaus, 2015). At the same time, there are reports that cross-border 
business monopolies have lured young people to engage in violence to eliminate business rivals 
from other clans and to continue illicit business operations. They have also relied on al-Shabaab 
for access to arms and to secure their business interests in exchange for facilitating youth 
recruitment (Sahgal et al., 2019).  
Markets, such as livestock markets, can be important shared spaces that bring different groups 
and communities within and across borders together, triggering the potential for conflict or 
resilience and peacebuilding (USAID et al., 2013). Business can also serve to transform the 
characterisations and perceptions of marginalised populations, in particular, that of Kenyan 
Somalis (Varming, 2020; Kirui, 2019). Their business success gives them greater influence and 
clout in calling for improved services and equal treatment before the law; and can make them 
important, willing collaborators in peacebuilding efforts (Kirui, 2019). 
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2. Conflict profile 
Conflict history and events 
Threats to peace and security in North Eastern Kenya are closely linked to legacies of 
state violence and marginalisation (Lind et al., 2017; NCIC & Interpeace, 2017). Historical 
injustices, neglect and repressive state policies under different governments over the decades 
have led to the political and economic marginalisation of the North East region and its 
underdevelopment. The state has also perpetrated indiscriminate violence against regional 
populations, particularly Kenyan Somalis (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017). 
In 1962, a year prior to Kenya’s independence, a majority of the people of Northern Kenya 
(then known as the Northern Frontier District) ‘almost unanimously’ preferred secession 
from the Kenyan state to Somalia, in a referendum organised by the British government. The 
British government ignored this result, however, and instead transformed the administrative 
arrangements of the Northern Frontier District into the North Eastern Province (NEP), comprising 
of Garissa, Wajir and Mandera (Lind et al., 2015). The first post-independence government made 
it clear it would maintain territorial borders, leading to insurgency across Northern Kenya 
(Kochore, 2016; Lind et al., 2015). The insurgents formed by Somalis and their allies, with 
support from Mogadishu, called themselves the Northern Frontier District Liberation Front, but 
were labelled shifta (‘bandit’) by the state (Kochore, 2016; Carrier & Kochore, 2014). 
State security forces used indiscriminate violence against the local Somali population 
during 1964-1967 in the name of ‘collective responsibility’ for the insurgency, killing an 
estimated 4,000 Somalis and thousands of livestock, the foundation of the Somali pastoral 
economy (Whittaker, 2015; Lind et al., 2015; Branch, 2014).  
Although the conflict officially came to an end in 1967, the NEP remained subject to 
emergency rule until 1991, with numerous instances of state-sponsored violence and 
intimidation against Somali residents. This included two massacres in Garissa and Wajir districts, 
in 1980 and 1984, respectively, and a nationwide ‘screening’ of all ethnic Somalis residing in 
Kenya during 1989 and 1990 (Whittaker, 2015).  
Political liberalisation in the 1990s, and the advent of multi-party politics, contributed to a 
new context for violent conflict in North Eastern Kenya, in the form of clan conflict and 
competition over scarce resources (Chome, 2019). At the same time, initiatives in Wajir, Garissa 
and Mandera aimed at clan accommodation and conflict resolution proved successful in 
stemming violence and restoring public security by 2005 – and in the case of Wajir, since the 
mid-1990s (Chome, 2016; Menkhaus, 2008). 
Widespread violence following Kenya’s 2007 general election results, which left more than 
a thousand people dead and over 350,000 displaced, highlighted the country’s troubled 
internal divisions, yet revealed the continued success of peace infrastructures in the 
North East (Nolasco, 2017; Lind et al., 2015; Menkhaus, 2015). Northern Kenya remained 
largely free of post-election violence that swept other parts of Kenya in 2007-2008 (Menkhaus, 
2015). Since this post-election violence, Kenya has had two hotly contested elections (2013 and 
2017), where the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission’s voter registration, 
counting, and tallying processes were also challenged before Kenya’s new Supreme Court 
(Maweu, 2019). The country was spared the violence experienced in the aftermath of the 2007 
election. However, the challenges have still contributed to a lack of trust in electoral institutions 
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and government; and ongoing mistrust between and among different communities (Maweu, 
2019). Efforts to address grievances, foster trust and to rebuild Kenya as a nation of diversity 
included a new Constitution (2010) and the devolution of power and resources to new county-
level administrations (Scharrer, 2018; Lind et al., 2015). 
Violence in the North East in subsequent elections has exposed a split in strategies with 
regard to election outcomes, with a negotiated democracy approach adopted in Wajir 
County and a winner-take-all in other counties. In Wajir County, which has experienced less 
violence, clan elders and political elites adopted a conflict prevention approach – in the form of 
‘negotiated democracy’ - attempting with varying degrees of success, to broker pre-election deals 
that allocated prized county and national government seats to specific clans or tribes (Menkhaus, 
2015). This approach thus sacrificed democratic principles for the purpose of maintaining peace. 
In some cases, negotiations have also sacrificed the incorporation and representation of women 
in politics. In some communities, the CoE determine the entire slate of candidates, which rarely 
include female candidates (Nyabola, 2016). In Mandera County, elections led to winner-take-all 
calculations on the part of communal groups, including inter-ethnic coalitions at the expense of 
third parties, contributing to a new cycle of violence (Menkhaus, 2015).  
While devolution has begun to pivotally redress the state’s neglect and historic 
marginalisation of pastoral areas, incidents of violence have risen due in large part to the 
effect of al-Shabaab (see Figure 1). Much of the increase in conflict is seen in Kenya’s North 
Eastern counties. The influence of al-Shabaab, the Somalia-based militant organisation, is a key 
development in the trend of rising conflict in Northern Kenya, particularly in Garissa and Mandera 
(Lind, 2018). Since 2012, al-Shabaab has targeted Northern Kenya as a site of deadly and 
destabilising terrorist attacks. It has sought to mobilise support from within Kenya and to advance 
its regional ambitions by stirring anxiety and fear; and unmasking deep divisions and a social 
order based on unequal citizenships (Lind et al., 2017). 
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Figure 1. Number of conflict events by county in northern Kenya, 2005-2014 
 
Source: Lind, 2018, p.41, drawn from ACLED data. © Elsevier.1 
Devolution over time appears to have helped to undercut support for al-Shabaab in the 
North East, while at the same time fostering greater competition among clans for local 
government posts (ICG, 2018). While the 2013 elections passed off fairly peacefully, there was 
subsequent violence in Mandera, connected with ethnic strategising and ethnic exclusion (Carrier 
& Kochore, 2014). There is some evidence that, as in Somalia, al-Shabaab has sought to exploit 
resulting clan disputes (Karienye & Warfa, 2020; Mohamed & Warfa, 2019; Sahgal et al., 2019; 
ICG, 2018). Ultimately, struggles for county-level political dominance and long-standing 
exclusions of periphery regions and minority groups, combined with the al-Shabaab threat and 
counter-productive security responses that disproportionately target Kenyan Somalis, contribute 
to a complex pattern of conflict (Lind, 2018; Lind et al., 2017). For further discussion, see 
Radicalisation and violent extremism under Conflict dynamics. 
There has been a spike in recent months in militant activity, which could be exacerbated 
further by the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The rise in militant activity since December 
2019 has continued into 2020 (REINVENT, 2020). Hardships caused by efforts to contain 
COVID-19 and resource allocations away from countering radicalisation and violent extremism to 
containing the pandemic may create a more enabling environment for militant activity (Mohamed, 
et al., 2020). 
                                                   
1 Reprinted from: Political Geography, 63, Lind, J., Devolution, shifting centre-periphery relationships and conflict 
in northern Kenya, 135–147, Copyright 2018, with permission from Elsevier. 
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Long-term solutions to violence in the North East requires an examination of recurring 
historical issues, such as addressing longstanding injustices in regional development, including 
resource allocation, and widespread ethnic manipulation in identity politics, which tend to 
undermine national solidarity (Maweu, 2019).  
Attention also needs to be paid to the various sources of resilience that have allowed (or 
have the potential to allow) peace to persist in the North East and nationally during different 
periods of time (Beston, 2018). 
Key areas of conflict 
While this section outlines particular types of conflict in the North East of Kenya, there is 
significant overlap and mutual dependence between the various kinds of conflict (Nolasco, 2017). 
This is evident, for example, in the case of cross-border conflicts, which can be fuelled in part by 
ethno-political related violence, violent extremist activities, and pastoralist-related conflict.  
Ethno-political related violence: The hardening of pre-existing identities in Northern Kenya 
under British rule and the “territorialization of ethnicity”, whereby differing groups of pastoralists in 
the North made stronger claims to certain territory as their own, intensified in the post-1992 era 
of multi-party elections (Carrier & Kochore, 2014, p. 4). While competition over pastoral 
resources has historically fuelled communal clashes, competition for political offices over the past 
two decades has fuelled more violent conflicts in Northern Kenya (Menkhaus, 2015). Elections in 
Kenya have tended to significantly increase the propensity for ethnic profiling, with politicians and 
political parties adept at inciting the public and mobilising ethnic alliances. This has in some 
cases contributed to violence (NCIC, 2018; Nolasco, 2017).  
Cross-border conflict: There has been a reported increase in the movement of armed groups 
across borders from Somalia and Ethiopia during armed conflicts in Northern Kenya since 1991 
(Menkhaus, 2015). Cross-border conflict remains a challenge to address due to the porosity of 
international borders, illicit trade in stolen cattle and arms, and the homogeneity of border 
communities in Northern and North Eastern regions (Nolasco, 2017). While some of the cross-
border violence can be considered to be ‘spillover’ effects from one side of the border to another, 
in most cases, it involves the rise of more complex cross-border conflict dynamics with clan 
groupings existing on both sides of various borders (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017; Menkhaus, 2015) 
For further discussion, see Cross-border clan actors and Cross-border conflict dynamics.  
There are also various conflicts across county boundaries. Growing scarcity of water and grazing 
land has, for example, contributed to pastoralists bringing cattle across the Garissa-Tana River 
county boundary, with local Somalis fighting against Pokomo farmers to protect their resources 
(Wakube et al., 2017). Recent clashes in June 2020 between pastoral communities along the 
Wajir-Marsabit border, linked to recurrent fighting over pasture and other resources, have 
resulted in multiple deaths (Makong, 2020). See also pastoralist-related conflict. There is also a 
political dispute linked to clan dynamics that Wajir County is expanding into Garissa (Wakube et 
al., 2017). 
Radicalism and violent extremism:  
Radicalisation and violent extremism in Kenya involves a pattern of repeated attacks and is 
inextricably linked with regional political problems, particularly in connection to Somalia (Nolasco, 
2017). The North East of Kenya shares characteristics with other recruitment hotspots, including 
a history of atrocities perpetrated by unaccountable security forces, along with official neglect 
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and exclusion (ICG, 2018). Al-Shabaab was not associated with any conflict events inside Kenya 
prior to 2008, but by 2015, the organisation was implicated in nearly 40% of all conflict events in 
Northern Kenya, mostly concentrated in Mandera, Wajir and Garissa (Lind, 2018). These include 
the massacre of 147 people in the 2015 Garissa University attack; and the 2014 Mandera 
massacres in which 64 non-Muslim Kenyans were executed while travelling by bus to other 
counties (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017). See Figure 2 and Table 1 for incidences of terrorism.  
Border communities are simultaneously most vulnerable to attacks by al-Shabaab and to the 
resulting responses from state security forces (Pact & Mercy Corps, 2018). Al-Shabaab has not 
pulled off a major strike outside Somalia since Garissa University. The threat of attack still 
lingers, however, and there has been a recent spike in violent incidents beginning at the end of 
2019 (REINVENT, 2020; ICG, 2018). For further discussion, see Al-Shabaab under Actors and 
Radicalisation and violent extremism under Conflict dynamics. 
Figure 2: Attacks attributed to al-Shabaab 2011-2018 (by county) 
 
Source: Abdille, 2019. © Crisis Group.2 
  
                                                   
2 Crises Group authorises the use of this material subject to the terms and conditions on its website: Copyright 
and Trademark Notice. 
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Table 1: Incidents of terrorism in Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania and Uganda (1 Jan 2016 - 27 July 2019) 
 Kenya Somalia Tanzania Uganda 
2016 54 854 13 36 
2017 225 1007 25 40 
2018 145 1224 9 59 
2019 42 1052 10 36 
Total 466 4137 57 171 
Source: van Zyl & Mahdi, 2019, drawn from ACLED data. 
Pastoralist-related, resource and land conflicts: The majority of the population in the North 
East of Kenya is pastoral. Conflicts among pastoral communities, and unfavourable climate 
conditions, are key causes of forced displacement and migration (Nolasco, 2017). After a 
protracted period of cattle raiding and communal violence during the1990s, community leaders 
and government representatives from the then Eastern and North Eastern Provinces brokered 
the Modogashe declaration of 2001 (Guyo, 2011). The declaration put pressure on government 
officials to prevent and/or arrest criminals in their localities; outlawed gun culture; and specified 
compensation for lives lost as a result of inter-communal conflict. It has been commended as an 
exemplary community peace initiative and is credited with the achievement of a long period of 
relative peace in the North East of Kenya (Guyo, 2011). Depleting resources and decreasing 
access to land has, however, become a driver of escalating inter-ethnic or inter-clan conflict over 
land, water and pasture (Nolasco, 2017; Mkutu et al., 2014). The Garre and Degodia clans, for 
example, frequently fight over control and ownership of water points (Nolasco, 2017). Further, 
government failures to invest in infrastructure and public services in pastoralist areas has 
exacerbated conflict in the region (Nolasco, 2017). In recent years, pastoralist communities have 
provided the largest market for small arms, rendering traditional cattle raiding much more lethal 
(Nolasco, 2017; Menkhaus, 2015).  
Violence against women and girls: Derived from unequal power relationships between men 
and women, VAWG is a key conflict problem in Kenya. Each year as many as one million women 
and girls experience some form of violence (Nolasco, 2017). The 2007-2008 post-election 
violence was characterised by widespread physical and sexual gender-based violence 
perpetrated by security and state personnel (Nolasco, 2017). The North East of Kenya was 
spared much of this post-election violence that transpired throughout other parts of the country. 
Sexual offences in the North East are often addressed through the traditional Maslaha system, 
however, particularly in rural areas, which results in under-reporting of such crimes and lack of 
clarity about prevalence (USDOS, 2019). For further discussion, see Traditional elders under 
Sources of resilience.  
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The North East is the region in Kenya with the highest prevalence of female genital mutilation or 
cutting (FGM/C) in women aged 15-49 at 97.5%, in contrast to 21% throughout Kenya (28 Too 
Many, 2018; Nolasco, 2017). At the same time, 92.5% of women and 88.8% of men aged 15–49 
in Kenya believe that FGM/C should be stopped (see 28 Too Many, 2018, 2). The Prohibition of 
Female Genital Mutilation Act criminalises all forms of female genital mutilation, regardless of the 
age or status of a girl or woman (28 Too Many, 2018). Perpetrators of FGM/C have since been 
arrested and cases successfully prosecuted (28 Too Many, 2018; Beston, 2018). However, 
implementation of the law and its enforcement remains a challenge due primarily to inadequate 
resources, difficulties reaching remote rural areas and the limited capacity of law-enforcement 
agents (28 Too Many, 2018). In addition, the effectiveness of criminalisation is curtailed by 
custom/tradition and religious influences. Eighty-two percent of respondents in a study on FGM/C 
practices in Kenya noted that tradition was the main reason why people in their community 
practised FGM/C, while religious obligations were cited by 1% (Meroka-Mutua et al., 2020, 32). 
For further discussion, see Traditional elders and Council of Elders under Sources of Resilience. 
Child marriage is also still practised, with most child marriages occurring in the North Eastern 
and Coast regions (OECD, 2019). It is estimated that almost one-fourth of girls in Kenya are 
married before the age of 18 (OECD, 2019). Similar to the case of FGM/C, criminalisation under 
the Marriage Act 2004 is insufficient to counter child marriage as they form part of long-standing 
customary practices and on socio-economic vulnerabilities. In order to effectively reduce the 
prevalence of child marriage and FGM/C, it is important to involve both genders in dialogue and 
action; and to address the root causes, such as poverty, lack of education, harmful social and 
cultural norms and unequal power dynamics (Warria, 2019). 
3. Conflict and resilience actors 
Most actors and categories of actors in the North East of Kenya are capable of advancing 
violence or peace, depending on the circumstances and calculation of their interests (Menkhaus, 
2015). Al-Shabaab is the only actor that can be described as a ‘total spoiler’ in the region 
(Menkhaus, 2015). In addition, actors can comprise various categories, wearing multiple hats – 
such as serving simultaneously as a political leader, an elder and a business person (Menkhaus, 
2015). 
Government and security actors 
Government officials: County governments have better local knowledge and are likely to enjoy 
greater local legitimacy. As such, they are well placed to address conflicts and promote peace, in 
partnership with the national government (Mkutu et al., 2014). In some cases, however, county 
governors have been accused of skewed appointments to their governments, based on support 
to ethnic constituencies, and marginalisation of minorities – which undermines their impartiality 
(Menkhaus, 2015; Mkutu et al., 2014). In other cases, such as in Wajir County, the first governor 
distributed positions and resources fairly (ICG, 2015). Governors, committed to peacebuilding, 
need to devote more time to confidence-building measures across communal lines (Menkhaus, 
2015). Across Northern Kenya, the county commissioner has also assumed a lead role in 
peacebuilding efforts, for example coordinating peace committees and convening Councils of 
Elders (Menkhaus, 2015). 
Military officials: The breakdown of trust between the local population and the security agencies 
began at independence, during the Shifta War, which pit the Kenyan army against secessionist 
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insurgents, backed by the Somali government (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017). A state of emergency 
was maintained until 1991, and the military maintained the strategy of ‘collective punishment’ to 
control and discipline the population throughout the 1970s and 1980s. They operated with little 
oversight (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017; Lind et al., 2015). Security agencies have committed mass 
atrocities against Somalis, with massacres in Garissa, Mandera and Wajir during the 1980s that 
claimed thousands of lives (Scharrer, 2018; NCIC & Interpeace, 2017). This history has led to an 
ongoing erosion of trust between the local population and the security agencies of the post-
colonial Kenyan state (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017). People continue to be afraid of sharing 
information with the security agencies for fear of being targeted in response and held collectively 
responsible (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017). The KDF have also been accused of engaging in 
corruption and of acting as brokers in the illegal cross-border trade of charcoal (Cannon & 
Pkalya, 2019; Mongare, 2019). For further discussion, see Weak social contract under Political 
and institutional factors, and Security issues under Conflict dynamics. 
Police officials: Since independence, the police has been linked with the protection of a small 
political and economic elite at the expense of the protection of all citizens. This has contributed to 
the public’s view of the police as a hostile, brutal, abusive, corrupt and ineffective force (Nolasco, 
2017). The police also often lack the necessary equipment and infrastructure to carry out their 
duties (Nolasco, 2017). A National Task Force for Police Reform, created in 2009, and 
subsequent laws passed in 2011, have allowed for improvements in police accountability. This 
includes the establishment of the Police Oversight Board, now the Independent Policing 
Oversight Authority (IPOA) overseeing the work of the Internal Affairs Unit and the Kenya Police 
Service, with powers to investigate and take corrective action on complaints of police misconduct 
and human rights abuses (Nolasco, 2017). Despite reforms, the endemic culture of corruption 
remains a deep-seated issue in the service (Nolasco, 2017). In some cases, the police have 
been accused of receiving large sums of money from terror suspects for the purposes of 
compromising investigations (Mongare, 2019). For further discussion, see Security issues under 
Conflict dynamics and Strengthened security arrangements under Sources of Resilience.  
Kenyan Somalis, refugees and displaced persons 
Kenyan Somalis: People had been leaving Somalia for Kenya since the 1970s as the Barre 
regime became increasingly restrictive (Lochery, 2012). The biggest group of the Somali 
population in Kenya live in the North East of Kenya, bordering Somalia and Ethiopia (Scharrer, 
2018). Virtually all Somalis in Kenya are Muslim (Menkhaus, 2015). Kenyan Somalis share their 
socialisation with other fellow Kenyans, but are treated as if not quite belonging to Kenya 
(Scharrer, 2018). The way in which the Kenyan state has historically viewed and treated the 
Somali population has contributed to the ‘othering’ of Kenyan Somali citizens, placing their lived 
experience of citizenship and the equality of rights at risk (Lind et al., 2015). At the same time, 
Kenyan Somalis find themselves in various roles: as marginalised citizens, as high-ranking 
politicians, as businesspeople and as urbanised (lower) middle-class Kenyans (Scharrer, 2018). 
Somali elites in Kenya have in the past, such as during the ‘screening’ process, used their 
position in high offices to eliminate economic and political rivals through detention and 
deportation – mirroring conflicts expressed along clan lines in Somalia (Scharrer, 2018; Lochery, 
2012). 
Refugees and displaced persons: The presence of Somali refugees in Kenya has influenced 
politics in some parts of Kenya, such as in Mandera County (Lind et al., 2015). From the early 
1990s onwards, anti-refugee sentiments were aimed at Somalis. They were not only collectively 
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associated with insecurity and later terrorism, but also to perceptions that they take away 
commercial opportunities from Kenyans (Scharrer, 2018; Lind et al., 2015). There have also 
been accusations that they acquired Kenyan passports illegally (Scharrer, 2018). Pressure to 
close Dadaab and for refugees to leave have grown since the rise of terrorist attacks (ICG, 
2015). Armed violence in Northern Kenya has also produced temporary population displacement 
on a small scale, such as during armed clashes in Mandera and Wajir (Menkhaus, 2015). 
External actors and influences 
Cross-border clans: While the former Northern frontier district region is home to a number of 
interrelated ethnic groups, including the Boran, Rendille, Gabra, Sakyue and Burji, it is primarily 
ethnic Somalis who inhabit the North East (Whittaker, 2015). In Somali society, the clan is the 
key unit of social structure (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017; Menkhaus, 2015). The Somali are divided 
between six clan families, which can be further sub-divided into clan, sub-clan and lineage 
groups. In the North East, the major clan groups are the Marehan, Ogaden, Ajuran, Degodia, 
Garre and Murulle (Whittaker, 2015). Loyalty to one’s clan is used at times by powerful 
individuals and groups to manipulate and mobilise individual clans against the others, and in 
some cases even among sub-clans of the same clan (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017). Since clan 
groupings exist on both sides of various borders,3 clan conflict can be related to wider cross-
border factors, interests and spillovers (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017; Menkhaus, 2015). The most 
recent conflict between the Garre and Degodia clans, for example, is believed to have started in 
Ethiopia before spilling over the border into Kenya’s Mandera, and later, Wajir Counties (NCIC & 
Interpeace, 2017). For further discussion, see the three County profiles and Cross-border conflict 
dynamics. 
Al-Shabaab: Al-Shabaab incursions from Somalia into Kenya is arguably the country’s main 
threat from foreign enemies (Botha & Abdile, 2020; Lind et al., 2017). Al-Shabaab was formed 
around 2004 by a small circle of militants. Its armed struggle against Ethiopian ‘occupiers’ 
between 2006 and 2009 generated considerable support among Somalis (ICG, 2018). The 
group’s recruitment in Kenya can be traced back to its origins in 2006 (Lind et al., 2017). The 
threat posed by al-Shabaab, and the occurrence of a series of kidnappings along the Kenyan 
coast in which al-Shabaab was implicated, prompted the Kenyan government to deploy troops to 
Somalia in 2011 (Botha & Abdile, 2020; Lind et al., 2017). Rather than prevent further attacks in 
Kenya, the deployment of the Kenyan Defence Force has led to a rise in al-Shabaab attacks, 
most notably the Garissa University attacks in 2015, killing 148 people, and Nairobi’s Westgate 
shopping centre attack in 2013, killing 67 people. These were planned and executed from 
Somalia in response to Kenyan presence in that country (Botha & Abdile, 2020; Lind et al., 
2017). While it is reported that al-Shabaab’s recruitment and popular support in the North East 
have subsided since 2015, there have still been sporadic assaults on police stations and on ‘non-
local’ (mainly Christian) public servants, including teachers (ICG, 2018).  
Al-Hijra: This is a Kenyan fundamentalist group previously known as the Muslim Youth Centre in 
Mombasa (Nolasco, 2017). It became the means for al-Shabaab to take the war to Kenya. The 
                                                   
3 For a map of Somali clan distribution in the Horn of Africa (Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Somalia) see Kenya 
Somali Consortium (2017, 21 July). Somali clans distribution in the horn of Africa. 
http://kenyasomali.blogspot.com/2017/07/somali-clans-distribution-in-horn-of.html  
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foundations, however, on which al-Shabaab relied upon to garner support are the social and 
economic grievances of the wider Kenyan Muslim community (Anderson & McKnight, 2015).  
Civil society actors 
Women: Women in the North East of Kenya have successfully mobilised in support of peace. 
Women peace activists in Wajir County, for example, gathered informally and mobilised women 
from opposing clans to discuss solutions, during a time when pastoralist violence was at a peak. 
This encouraged momentum toward a more formalised peacemaking process, leading to the 
negotiated 1993 Al Fatah Declaration – a declaration for return to peace (Wise et al., 2019). 
More recently, following the Garre-Marehan conflict in Mandera in March 2012, Belet Hawa 
women for peace conducted a series of peace dialogues with youth and women to stop revenge 
attacks. They are credited with securing the implementation of the ceasefire (USAID et al., 2013). 
Women for peace organisations have also led trauma healing work implemented following 
outbreaks of violence (USAID et al., 2013). Despite playing such crucial roles, women are often 
looked down upon in decision-making processes in the highly patriarchal Somali community of 
North Eastern Kenya (Dahir, 2011). The more women speak out and voice their commitment to 
peace and non-violence, and the more they form part of networking forums with other 
stakeholders, the greater the likelihood that attitudes toward women’s role will shift (Pact & Mercy 
Corps, 2018). Other key impediments to women’s active role in peacebuilding include illiteracy 
and lack of conflict resolution and mediation skills; fear of victimisation; lack of confidence; 
chronic poverty and family responsibilities; and poor coordination among women (USAID et al., 
2013).  
Women have at times played a mixed role in conflict. In Mandera County, for example, women 
have been accused of encouraging conflict using folklore, inciteful songs and poems, despite the 
fact that their suffering is disproportionate to that of men during violent conflict. Some of these 
poems, songs and hateful messages have gone viral on social media, intensifying tensions 
between clans and exacerbating violent conflict in some cases (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017). 
Elders: Traditional elders and CoEs retain extensive influence and authority in the Somali 
context generally (Nyamweru & Chidongo, 2018; USAID et al., 2013). Communal groups in 
Northern Kenya have traditional elders whose roles include negotiating application of customary 
law – an important source of conflict management, conflict resolution and enforcement of peace 
agreements (Nolasco, 2017; Menkhaus, 2015). Elders have also been key actors, however, in 
mobilising voters along ethnic and clan lines and provoking conflict, as in the 2013 elections in 
Northern Kenya. Such attempts succeeded strongly in Mandera (Carrier & Kochore, 2014; 
Menkhaus, 2015). The proliferation of multiple clan elders allied with different politicians has in 
some cases eroded their influence (USAID et al., 2013). In addition, Councils of Elders in Kenya 
have rarely supported a female candidate for any national position and have even intervened to 
discourage women from running (Nyabola, 2016). For further discussion, see Traditional elders 
and Council of Elders under Sources of Resilience. 
Religious leaders: Customary and religious leaders continue to play a significant role in 
influencing the attitudes and behaviours of communities in Northern Kenya, particularly in 
remote, pastoral communities (Pact & Mercy Corps, 2018). In Mandera County, for example, 
religious leaders played important roles in cross border dialogue prior to Kenya’s incursion into 
Somalia, facilitating many cross border incidents, ranging from the release of captured persons 
to helping address allegations of police brutality (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017). After the incursion, 
however, the same leaders found themselves on the receiving end, treated with suspicion by the 
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Kenyan government of supporting al-Shabaab; while at the same time targeted by al-Shabaab as 
‘enemies of the cause’ (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017). When a violent conflict erupts and the 
government fails to contain it, religious leaders are still often called upon even though they do not 
always receive the requisite facilitation and suitable conditions to mitigate conflicts (NCIC & 
Interpeace, 2017). For further discussion, see Religious leaders and inter-faith dialogue under 
Sources of Resilience. 
Youth: The appeal of extremism among young people is a significant threat to peace and 
stability in the North East of Kenya (Lind et al., 2015). Much research finds that the treatment of 
youth by security personnel is a frequently cited driver of recruitment into violent groups, such as 
in the case of youth in Mandera (Pact & Mercy Corps, 2018). Other pull factors include 
inadequate educational opportunities and unemployment (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017). Forums 
bringing together youth leaders from different clans across Mandera County have given young 
people the platform to share their learning, experiences, and successes and to continue to build 
their networks (Pact & Mercy Corps, 2018). Youth have organised peace talks; held peace rallies 
to provide civic education to the community and to pass messages of peaceful, free, and fair 
elections; and organised meetings with local security agencies to enhance trust-building (Pact & 
Mercy Corps, 2018). For further discussion, see Radicalisation and violent extremism under 
Conflict dynamics and Strengthened security arrangements under Sources of Resilience. 
Business people: Most businesses in the Northern and North East Kenya have a strong stake 
in basic peace and security and have thus been active supporters of local peace committees 
(Menkhaus, 2015). Clashes, such as recent violence between the Garre and Degodia clans in 
Mandera and Wajir and violent extremist attacks by al-Shabaab in Garissa town have been 
problematic for local business (Menkhaus, 2015). Businesses are often reliant on cross-
communal trust networks and partnerships, which allow for useful lines of communication to 
manage conflicts (Menkhaus, 2015). The role of business can be double-edged, however 
(Mohamed & Warfa, 2019). Business interests can and sometimes do support or even provoke 
armed conflict, for example by inciting their clans to violence as part of an effort to drive a rival 
business person out of town or lay claim to an important trade route (Menkhaus, 2015). There 
are reports that powerful business people have used young people to execute attacks or 
assassinate business rivals from the other clan in order to ensure the continuity of conflict and 
illicit business, such as the flow of small arms and smuggling of food items, such as sugar, milk 
and cooking oil (Mohamed & Warfa, 2019). Al-Shabaab has embedded itself in cross-border 
trade, taxing traders at roadblocks and providing escort from Kismayo to Mandera Town through 
trade routes which were weakly manned by the police patrols (Mohamed & Warfa, 2019). In turn, 
efforts by business people to protect their interests and safeguard smuggling routes at the 
Kenya-Somalia border have provided an enabling platform for al-Shabaab to extend their 
operations (Sahgal et al., 2019). The emergence of Somalia-Kenya cross-border business 
monopolies, alongside the presence of al-Shabaab, have thus perpetuated clan violence and 
disorder. For further discussion, see Radicalisation and violent extremism under Conflict 
dynamics. 
For further discussion on positive aspects of business and business actors, see Business under 
Sources of Resilience. 
4. County profiles: Garissa, Mandera and Wajir 
This report focuses on three counties in the North East: Garissa, Mandera and Wajir. 
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Garissa County: Bordering Somalia, Garissa County possesses unusual demographics due to 
the presence of the large refugee population it hosts at Dadaab, near the Somali border. The 
county itself is home to 841,353 residents, according to the 2019 census. The vast majority of 
Garissa county residents (refugees excluded) are ethnic Somalis from the Ogaden clan with its 
sub-clans: Aulihan, Abudwak and Abdallah (Chome, 2016; Menkhaus, 2015; Mkutu et al., 2014). 
The other groups in the county, considered ‘corner tribes,’ include the Mohamed Zubeyr, 
Makabul, and a few members of the Degodia (Rotich & Warfa, 2019). The three sub-clans of 
Abudwak, Aulihan and Abdallah in Garissa Township fight for resources, such as plots of land, 
particularly in Waberi East location (Rotich & Warfa, 2019). 
While the County is largely rural, Garissa town, which is the biggest commercial centre in 
Northern Kenya, and Dadaab town (separate from the refugee camp) have attracted a large 
number of migrants, including professionals, business owners and casual labourers (Menkhaus, 
2015). The County is semi-arid and experiences somewhat higher levels of rainfall than most of 
the rest of Northern Kenya (Menkhaus, 2015). 
Garissa County has not suffered from large scale communal violence in recent years but has 
seen a noticeable deterioration in public security due to a spike in violent criminality and terrorist 
attacks by al-Shabaab (Menkhaus, 2015; Mkutu et al., 2014). In addition, devolution and the 
creation of new political boundaries have given rise to a number of disagreements between sub-
clans, which could raise political competition to conflict levels (Chome, 2016). The Abudwak 
dominates political seats in the county (Rotich & Warfa, 2019). Political competition is a key 
source of clan animosity and hostilities. Politicians engage clan elders and youth in their fight for 
seats and elected leaders tend to favour their clans in awarding tenders and employment 
opportunities (Rotich & Warfa, 2019). Recent research finds that leaders of the Abudwak clan 
tend to dominate the share of county positions and economic resources, with other groups and 
Ogaden sub-clans politically marginalised (Rotich & Warfa, 2019). Such inter-clan tension can 
increase the prospect for the infiltration of al-Shabaab, with respondents also noting that some 
clans have acquired guns from Somalia, which can escalate clan conflicts (Rotich & Warfa, 
2019). 
Mandera County: The County’s strategic location at Kenya’s border with both Somalia and 
Ethiopia means that its conflicts are thoroughly regionalised and cannot be understood without 
reference to wider cross-border factors and interests (Menkhaus, 2015). The politics of clan 
identity among Somali clans and hostilities have frequently spilled over into the county, triggering 
inter-communal conflicts, border conflicts, competition over limited resources, and recurrent 
terrorism activities (Mohamed & Warfa, 2019). 
According to the 2019 census, the county is home to 867,457 residents. The population 
comprises mainly ethnic Somalis categorised into four clan groupings: the Garre, the Murulle and 
the Degodia clans, and the ‘Corner Tribes’, a grouping of the smaller clans (NCIC & Interpeace, 
2017). Mandera County is extremely hot and arid and the population is primarily rural and 
pastoral (Mohamed & Warfa, 2019; Menkhaus, 2015). Mandera ranks near the bottom of all 
Kenyan counties in terms of poverty levels, with thousands of households in Mandera lacking 
access to basic infrastructure (Abdille, 2019; Cannon & Ali, 2018; Menkhaus, 2015). 
The history of contemporary inter-clan conflict in Mandera is marked by periods of high and low 
peaks, with the most recent cycle of conflict occurring in 2011-2015. Traditionally fuelled by 
competition over resources, recent conflicts have been exacerbated by new trigger factors such 
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as competition between clans for political influence, disputes over land, and attacks by al-
Shabaab (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017; Chome, 2016; Menkhaus, 2015).  
Devolution has widened gaps between communities, with bigger clans and their allies benefiting 
while minorities and the marginalised lack representation in county affairs. This further 
aggravates existing inter-clan conflicts in the county (Mohamed & Warfa, 2019). Violence 
between the Garre and Degodia clans in 2013, 2014 and 2016 were related to political devolution 
and the rise in clan-based competition for resources in the county (Mohamed & Warfa, 2019). 
The Garre community has tended to dominate politics in Mandera County, with the Murulle and 
Garre considering themselves to be residents and Degodia as migrants. The Garre and Murulle 
clan alliance that formed the 2013–2017 County Government had the effect of isolating the 
Degodias. While the Degodia lost their Mandera North constituency then, they won the 
parliamentary seat back in 2017 (Mohamed & Warfa, 2019). Local-level competition is often 
compounded by the influence of political events in Somalia and Ethiopia (Chome, 2016). Further, 
politicians have fuelled inter-clan conflicts by orchestrating massive transfers of voters from other 
counties and neighbouring Ethiopia and Somalia regions to tilt the outcome of election for County 
gubernatorial and constituency posts (Mohamed & Warfa, 2019). 
Wajir County: The County stretches from the border of Ethiopia southward to Garissa County, 
bordering Somalia and Isiolo and Marsabit counties to the east and Mandera County to the 
northeast. It is thinly populated and mainly pastoral. Wajir’s climate is hot and arid. The most 
recent 2019 census cited a population of 781,263. The vast majority of the population is 
ethnically Somali, with three Somali clans predominant: the Ajuran, Degodia and Ogaden 
(Chome, 2016; Menkhaus, 2015). The Degodia clan form the majority in the County followed by 
the Ogaden and Ajuran respectively. The main sub-clans of Degodia are Masaare, Fai and 
Jibrael while the sub-clans for Ajuran are Gelbaris and Waqle (Karienye & Warfa, 2020).  
Clans such as the Degodia and Ogaden have ties with kin in Mandera and Garissa counties as 
well as in Ethiopia and Somalia. Such cross-border ties have at times been cited as the main 
cause of communal conflict in the County (Chome, 2016). Wajir County also suffers similarly 
from land pressures and disputes and political contestation over county government and 
constituencies, similar to other counties in the region (Menkhaus, 2015). Clan numerical majority 
within the County has been exploited to gain political and economic power, marginalising the 
minority clans (Karienye & Warfa, 2020). Wajir’s political and civic leadership have, however, 
been more committed to and more successful at managing these pressures and in stemming and 
reducing violence (Menkhaus, 2015). Existing civic-government arrangements, such as the Wajir 
Peace and Development Committee (WPDC) formed in 1995, have created a local environment 
well predisposed to conflict mitigation. For further discussion, see Peace Committees under 
Sources of Resilience. Incidents of inter-clan conflicts and violence in Wajir were minimal prior to 
2014, in comparison to Mandera and Garissa (Karienye & Warfa, 2020). Conflicts stemming from 
political devolution are, however, threatening to weaken these local capacities. In addition, Wajir 
continues to be vulnerable to the spillover of conflict from other counties, in particular from 
Mandera County as witnessed in mid-2014 (Chome, 2016). The weakening of the WPDC, due to 
lack of funding, purposeful neglect and transition to County Peace Forums (CPFs), that are 
considered to be more aligned with the governing team, has also contributed to the rise in clan 
conflict since 2014 (Karienye & Warfa, 2020). 
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5. Root causes of conflict 
Political and institutional factors 
Elite power struggles, identity politics and political exclusion 
One of the most potent drivers of conflict in Kenya is the persistence of a system of 
political patronage, often along ethnic lines (Nolasco, 2017; Cox et al., 2014). The behaviour 
of political elites is deeply tied to identity politics and clientelism, whereby state resources, jobs 
and contracts are allocated on an ethnic basis. This continues to undermine social cohesion - 
fostering divisive political narratives, inter-ethnic competition, ethnic stereotyping, and the 
hardening of ethnic identities that were previously more fluid and nuanced (Nolasco, 2017; Cox 
et al., 2014). Elites have also engaged in the incitement of communities, through hate speech 
(Cox et al., 2014). These processes have contributed to a deterioration in community relations, 
communal clashes and violent crime (Nolasco, 2017). In the North East of Kenya, identity politics 
are central to Kenya-Somalia border conflicts. Influential Somali clan members, such as political 
leaders, often manipulate Somali clan identities and existing cleavages in their pursuit of power 
and control of resources (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017; Nolasco, 2017). In Mandera County, political 
tensions between the Degodia and Mandera’s majority Garre have escalated to violent clashes 
between the two communities between 2007-2013, which have spread into neighbouring Wajir 
County, where the Degodia form the majority (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017). 
New electoral rules and provisions for inclusion now exist but are insufficient to counter 
the entrenched culture of clientelism. Instituted in 2013, devolution in Kenya seeks to bring 
government closer to the people by devolving political and economic resources to the 47 county 
governments, such that local needs can be addressed more effectively (Cannon & Ali, 2018). 
Electoral rules that incentivise crosscutting coalitions and lay out new processes and 
requirements for inclusivity are now in place. However, informal, divisive political behaviours 
often continue to dominate government apparatus and are deeply embedded within governance 
processes (Cox et al., 2014). This makes it very difficult for leaders to truly support the broader 
social cohesion agenda (Cox et al., 2014). Even though crosscutting social engagement can 
often be observed in everyday life (religious, economic, business, families, shared traditions), the 
‘rules of the game’ for politics and allocation of state resources remain identity-based and deeply 
divisive (Cox et al., 2014).  
Vulnerabilities of populations in the North East of Kenya under the prior centralised 
system now centres upon minority clans within counties (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017). 
Devolution has resulted in the entrenchment of ‘winner-takes-all’ ethnic politics at the county 
level. Communities previously marginalised at the national level are now powerful majorities in 
their local counties (D’Arcy & Nistotskaya, 2019). In Mandera County, for example, minority clans 
stand at a political, economic and socio-cultural disadvantage relative to the big clans. Minority 
respondents cite issues with inequitable resource-sharing, mostly in the form of inequitable 
representation in the County Assembly and low employment numbers in the Mandera County 
Public Service Board (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017). Some minority clans, such as the Watta 
community that has never been employed by the County government and the Corner Tribes 
consider their rights as having been better protected under the former centralised system of 
government. They report the loss of plots, farms and some elective seats (NCIC & Interpeace, 
2017). The plight of minority clans and other special groups is a potential conflict trigger and 
impediment to peace (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017). 
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For further discussion, see Devolution dynamics.  
Weak social contract 
Current threats to peace and security in the North East arise in part from a long trajectory 
of problematic state-society (or state-citizen) relations between the Kenyan state and 
ethnic Somalis (Lind et al., 2017). North Eastern Kenya has historically been relegated to the 
periphery of the Kenyan Nation during colonial and post-colonial times. The British labelled 
Somalis the ‘Alien Somali’ and, after independence, the Kenyan state continued to treat Somalis 
as not quite belonging to the state (Scharrer, 2018). Treated as a thing apart, people in Northern 
Kenya experienced social, political and economic marginalisation from the post-colonial Kenyan 
state, undermining any sense of belonging to the nation (Kochore, 2016). For further discussion, 
see Inequality, exclusion and marginalisation.  
The state has not only neglected the region, it has also committed atrocities in the North 
East, which has made relationships between the communities and state deeply problematic 
(Lind, 2018; Lind et al., 2017; Kochore, 2016; Carrier & Kochore, 2014). When the violent shifta 
conflict officially came to an end in 1967, a state of emergency remained in force, and 
counterinsurgency methods of administration, including the indiscriminate use of collective 
punishment (a carryover from colonialism), continued in NEP, spanning into the 1990s 
(Whittaker, 2015). State violence included two massacres in Garissa and Wajir districts, in 1980 
and 1984 respectively, and further atrocities committed during a nationwide ‘screening’ of all 
ethnic Somalis residing in Kenya during 1989-1990 (Whittaker, 2015). During the ‘screening’ 
process, the government scrutinised the identity and origins of Kenyan Somalis in NEP, in order 
to distinguish ‘original’ from ‘foreign’ Somalis and to expel the latter. Those declared citizens 
were granted pink ‘certificates of verification’ (Scharrer, 2018; Lochery, 2012). This exercise was 
framed as a response to insecurity in the North, blamed on the growing presence of ethnic 
Somalis (Lochery, 2012). Somali elites in Kenya also used the opportunity to eliminate economic 
and political rivals through detention and deportation (Scharrer, 2018; Lochery, 2012).  
How the Kenyan state has historically viewed and treated the ethnic Somali population 
has contributed to the ‘othering’ of Kenyan Somali citizens, putting their lived experience 
of citizenship and equality of rights at risk (Lind et al., 2015). While the rhetoric of ‘othering’ 
has shifted from shifta and bandits, to poachers, refugees, then pirates and now al-Shabaab, the 
political strategies adopted by the Kenyan state remain the same. They include screening and 
registration, checkpoints and repeated raids now in the urban areas (Scharrer, 2018). Even as 
Kenyan Somalis have become a stronger part of Kenyan political and economic spheres, they 
remain marginalised in terms of legal recognition of their citizenship (Scharrer, 2018). The 
experience with ‘screening’ demonstrated that at any moment one might lose one’s status as 
someone who belongs here (Scott-Villiers, 2017). Even after the identity requirements on Kenyan 
Somalis were removed in 1997, in practice, they have continued to be subject to routine stop and 
searches by the police and coerced into paying bribes (Lind et al., 2017; Lochery, 2012). It also 
remains difficult for Kenyan Somalis to access basic citizenship documentation (NCIC & 
Interpeace, 2017). 
The sense of being part of a targeted, marginalised group is not only about state-society 
relations but also citizen-society relations (Lind et al., 2015). The dynamics between the 
Kenyan Somali population and other Kenyan nationals further influence a sense of citizenship 
among the Kenyan Somalis (Lind et al., 2015). The success stories of Kenyan Somalis 
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contributing to society in political and economic spheres could change the narrative that sees 
them as outsiders and a threat to security (see the section on Business under Sources of 
Resilience) (Kirui, 2019). This has not necessarily materialised, however, and has instead in 
some cases fuelled fears that Somalis are taking over the country (Kirui, 2019). Further, Kenya 
Somalis are often still seen as a security threat, driven in large part by the politicisation of 
terrorist attacks by various politicians and the securitised responses of the state, in the form of 
military intervention in Somalia and counter-terrorism raids in Somali areas (International Alert, 
2016; Lind et al., 2015). This affects perceptions of and attitudes toward Somalis in everyday life 
(Lind et al., 2015). For further discussion, see Radicalisation and violent extremism under 
Conflict dynamics. 
The treatment of particular populations in Kenya as a security threat has extended beyond 
Kenyan Somalis, who are primarily Muslim, to other Kenyan Muslims (Scharrer, 2018). 
Concerns over al-Shabaab and fears of large-scale attacks have led to a widening of state 
surveillance of Muslims generally. As in the case of ethnic Somalis, the vulnerability of many 
predominantly Muslim groups in Kenya (e.g. coastal Muslims and Kenyans of Arab or Asian 
descent) has a historical basis (Lochery, 2012). When applying for a passport, for example, 
Muslims are required to produce additional documentary evidence of citizenship, in contrast to 
Christian applicants (Botha & Abdile, 2020).  
State-society relations in the North East is also undermined by the absence of the state 
from people’s daily lives - a pattern of absent or poor basic public services, including the 
provision of security services (Lind, 2018; International Alert, 2016). The problem has shifted 
from state violence to state neglect of insecurity in the region. The state tends to view insecurity 
in the region through a narrow lens of clan divisions, requiring local mediation and resolution, 
thus absolving itself of any responsibility to respond (Lind et al., 2015). This perception that 
insecurity in the North East has become normalised reflects the ‘othering’ of Somalis in Kenyan 
society (Lind et al., 2015). For example, experts interviewed compared the slow and inadequate 
government response to the outbreak of clashes in Mandera and Wajir in June 2014, which left 
60 dead and over 75,000 displaced, with the rapid high-level government response to the 
Mpeketoni attack during the same month, with 67 victims (Lind et al., 2015). Other services are 
also lacking, such as education. Secondary school facilities in the North East are more dispersed 
than in other parts of the country, undermining access (Abdille, 2019).  
Muslim communities in low-income neighbourhoods in Kenya have also come to see 
themselves as being at the periphery of the state’s interest, due to a lack of government 
services, including security. The lack of government legitimacy in such marginalised communities 
and the need to turn to informal networks for services is also a key challenge in countering 
violent extremism (International Alert, 2016). For further discussion, see Radicalisation and 
violent extremism under Dynamics. 
A key aspect of the security crisis in the North East – and in Kenya in general – is the loss 
of faith in the capacity of the state to deliver collective security and find a just solution to 
local conflicts. This pertains to the state in centralised or devolved form (ICG, 2015). Due to prior 
state-perpetrated acts of violence and now the sense of neglect, security institutions are often not 
trusted by local communities in the region (Lind, 2018). For further discussion, see Security 
issues under Dynamics. 
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These problems with state-society relations and citizenship are intertwined with generalised 
discrimination faced by Somali Kenyans and other groups in the North East of Kenya. See the 
next section on Regional inequality, exclusion and marginalisation.  
Regional inequality, exclusion and marginalisation 
The threat to peace and security in the North East is strongly tied to unaddressed 
historical injustices, including entrenched forms of marginalisation, exclusion and 
inequality (Lind et al., 2017). The long history of patronage and clientelism has created a system 
where access to political power ensures access to scarce economic resources, benefitting some 
groups and largely marginalising others (Cox et al., 2014). This has also fostered inter-group 
grievances and undermines movement toward inter-group reconciliation necessary for cohesion 
(Cox et al., 2014). Exclusion and inequality as a cause of conflict may be connected to the weak 
social contract, discussed under political and institutional factors. 
Northern Kenya, and in particular the North East, has long experienced the highest levels 
of poverty and underdevelopment. The levels of poverty, unemployment, and 
underdevelopment in the Kenya-Somalia border area, in particular, are among the highest in 
Kenya and are key contributors to crime, insecurity, and alienation (Nolasco, 2017). Garissa, 
Wajir and Mandera are among the seven poorest of Kenya’s 47 counties, with poverty levels of 
66%, 63% and 78%, respectively, compared to 36% across the country (Abdille, 2019). The 
North and North East lag behind the rest of the country in a range of education, health, and 
infrastructure indicators (see Figure 3). Northern Kenyan counties are at the bottom of almost 
every human development ranking in Kenya, with Wajir and Mandera cited as falling among the 
bottom four (Menkhaus, 2015). In Mandera County, high levels of maternal mortality surpass the 
national average and that of wartime Sierra Leone, according to the United Nations Population 
Fund (see NCIC & Interpeace, 2017).  
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Figure 3: Development indicators – North & North Eastern Kenya vs National percentages 
 
Source: World Bank, 2018. © The World Bank Group.4 
Note: NEDI = North and Northeastern Development Initiative.5 
Most people in Northern Kenya are pastoralists dependent on increasingly scarce 
resources, such as water, arable land and pasture, for their survival (Witsenburg & Adano, 
2009). Northern Kenya houses the greatest concentration of pastoral communities in the country 
and there is a strong perception among these communities that the government has treated them 
and continues to treat them unfairly, signifying a high level of local alienation from the 
government (Menkhaus, 2015).  
One of the most enduring consequences of the shifta counter-insurgency measures has 
been the sense of victimisation among pastoralists in Northern Kenya (Whittaker, 2012). The 
various measures taken then by the state, which resulted in livestock losses and 
impoverishment, continue to reverberate today in terms of the economic and social 
marginalisation of pastoralist groups (Scharrer, 2018; Whittaker, 2012). By regulating and 
restricting movement to and from pasture areas, as was done during colonial times, livestock 
keepers were left unable to properly care for their herds. This form of communal punishment of 
North Eastern Kenyans for shifta systematically reduced livestock holdings, leaving many 
                                                   
4 The World Bank Group authorises the use of this material subject to the terms and conditions on its website: 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/legal/terms-and-conditions  
5 NEDI counties include Garissa, Isiolo, Lamu, Mandera, Marsabit, Samburu, Tana River, Turkana, Wajir and 
West Pokot. 
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households destitute (Branch, 2014; Whittaker, 2012). Further, the state has not invested much 
in infrastructure and public services in the pastoralist region (Nolasco, 2017). 
Muslims concentrated in the North East, coastal area and parts of Nairobi have felt 
excluded from power in a country dominated by Christians (84% of the population) - where 
power and economic opportunity is highly correlated with ethnicity (International Alert, 2016). 
Combined with the historical track record of state security abuses of populations in Northern 
Kenya, these socio-political and economic grievances held by Muslim communities have 
produced a narrative of Muslim persecution by the Kenyan state and its Western allies 
(International Alert, 2016; Menkhaus, 2015). This has provided a platform for mobilisation into 
violence. For further discussion, see Radicalisation and violent extremism under Conflict 
dynamics and the Military under Actors. 
Resource and environmental factors 
Northern Kenya is an economically marginalised region, where water, arable land, and 
pasture are scarce and shrinking resources (Witsenburg & Adano, 2009). Competition for the 
control of political and economic resources – and unequal access to land and natural resources - 
are considered to be drivers of recurrent violence and key threats to security (Botha & Abdile, 
2020; Whittaker, 2017).  
High poverty levels in the arid and semi-arid North East have been attributed partly to a 
historical bias in resource allocation, whereby more resources were allocated to high-
rainfall areas under the assumption that such areas would give better returns to investments 
than arid or semi-arid lands (ASALs). Wajir, Mandera and Garissa are 100% ASAL (Njoka et al., 
2016) – and ASALs contain 18 of the 20 poorest constituencies in Kenya (Njoka et al., 2016). 
The weaker socio-economic situation in Kenya’s ASALs means that climate shocks and 
stresses, especially drought, normally have greater consequences in these areas, such as 
acute food shortages (Njoka et al., 2016). Climate instability has produced more frequent and 
intense weather extremes, such as more frequent experience with droughts in the North East 
and other parts of Kenya (Njoka et al., 2016). Environmental challenges, combined with droughts 
and a history of ethnic violence, exacerbate the potential for widespread violence in Northern 
Kenya. Other socio-economic consequences of climate change include changing demographic 
patterns in ASALs. This stems from the relocation of populations to towns after losses of 
livestock-based livelihoods and from insecurity and conflicts arising from competition for scarce 
resources (Njoka et al., 2016). At the same time, a study on how climate change may affect 
raids-related violence finds that greater rainfall instead has the potential to increase the level of 
raids in the short-term by increasing the demand for agricultural land that performs well with 
more rainfall (Witsenburg & Adano, 2009). 
Pastoral conflicts have become more frequent and unpredictable, exacerbated by scarce 
resources, and have increasingly involved the use of arms (Njoka et al., 2016; Witsenburg & 
Adano, 2009). In Mandera County, for example, a primary cause of inter-clan conflicts among 
pastoralist communities has been the scarcity of water and pasture and clan struggles to control 
grazing land and water points (Mohamed & Warfa, 2019). Growing resource scarcity in pastoral 
areas is attributed to population increase, environmental degradation, restricted access to 
pasture (due to enclosures, ranches, and development projects), all of which heighten communal 
tensions (Menkhaus, 2015). The illicit cross-border supply of small arms and demand by 
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pastoralist communities has made pastoral conflicts more violent and lethal (Nolasco, 2017; 
Menkhaus, 2015). For further discussion, see Pastoralist-related violence under Conflict profile. 
The spoils of development have complicated and created new patterns of violence 
(Whittaker, 2017). In colonial times, the available spoils of development were limited to water and 
pasture. The exclusionary nature of colonial water and grazing schemes created a zero-sum-
game in the struggle for access to these resources, manipulated for local elites in search of 
power and advantages over rivals (Whittaker, 2017). Development projects have continued after 
independence to form part of governmental efforts to gain political control over peripheral 
territories that are perceived to have economic potential (Whittaker, 2017). In the context of 
devolution, investment in development also has the potential to fuel conflict. Substantial 
investment in agriculture by the Mandera County government, for example, is a factor that could 
inadvertently trigger further conflicts through increased competition for resources (NCIC & 
Interpeace, 2017). 
Devolution in Kenya has coincided with the discovery of oil in Turkana County with 
prospecting also taking place in Garissa county (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017; Mkutu et al., 
2014). This is likely to transform pastoral areas of Kenya and their livelihood systems (Mkutu et 
al., 2014). Oil exploration changes the land value system to a commercial one, raising the 
demand for and prices of land (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017). Kenya has four sedimentary basins 
(Lamu, Anza, Mandera, and Tertiary Rift Basins) and geological formations that are an extension 
of, or have similar characteristics to, those of neighbouring countries where large hydrocarbon 
reserves have already been found (Vasquez, 2013). 
Deep-rooted inequalities persist in areas where oil and hydrocarbon reserves are located, 
which makes the way in which anticipated revenues are shared of particular importance 
as a potential source of conflict or resilience (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017; Vasquez, 2013). If local 
populations are left out of the discussions and do not benefit from the reserves, this could serve 
as another source of conflict (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017). Producing counties need to ensure that 
participatory resource management mechanisms and mechanism for equitable distribution are in 
place before revenues from oil and hydrocarbons start to flow (Vasquez, 2013). This should be 
better enabled through devolution, whose aim is to ensure more equitable development 
(Vasquez, 2013). Preferably, by the time revenues start to flow, a list of prioritised development 
projects to be funded with the new revenues will have been identified, with direct input from the 
community (Vasquez, 2013). 
The history of land occupation and displacement, under colonial and post-independence 
periods, has produced deep communal grievances and divergent communal narratives about 
historic claims to land (Menkhaus, 2015). Land grievances have been utilised by political actors 
during electoral periods to mobilise particular communities (D’Arcy & Nistotskaya, 2019; 
Menkhaus, 2015).  
The 2010 Constitution has not fundamentally altered the underlying logic of ethnic 
patronage politics or addressed land grievances – and has instead contributed to new 
conflicts over land ownership. Alongside devolution, the Constitution aimed to lay the 
foundation for change in the politics of land ownership and administration (D’Arcy & Nistotskaya, 
2019). Devolution has transformed communities previously marginalised at the national level into 
powerful majorities in their home counties and this has emboldened their claims over land 
(D’Arcy & Nistotskaya, 2019). Such tensions have been elevated by the Constitution’s 
recognition of ancestral rights, which has provided county majorities with a legal basis for their 
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land ownership claims (D’Arcy & Nistotskaya, 2019). This has compounded the tension between 
land rights over the same piece of land held under title (the legal basis of most county ethnic 
minority claims) and ancestral/autochthonous rights (the legal basis of most county ethnic 
majority claims) (D’Arcy & Nistotskaya, 2019). 
6. Conflict dynamics 
Cross-border conflict dynamics 
Poor security and porous borders in the North and North East of Kenya, particularly the 
680 km border with Somalia, has produced a complex set of conflict dynamics. It is 
considered to contribute to the proliferation of small arms in the region and illicit trade in cattle; 
and to enable the expansion of al-Shabaab activities (Nolasco, 2017). While cross-border 
conflicts within and between pastoralist communities, such as raiding and cattle-rustling, have a 
long history along Kenya’s borders, these conflicts have become increasingly destructive and 
less manageable (Nolasco, 2017). Cattle rustling has gone beyond limited rustling among 
pastoralist communities and has become embedded in wider criminal networks that serve 
national and regional black markets (Nolasco, 2017). The cross-border exchange of people, 
particularly since the early 1990s, and the growth of the Somali refugee population in the North 
East has also been a concern from the perspective of the Kenyan government (Whittaker, 2017). 
The single largest collection of settled households in the border area is the Dadaab camp, where 
about 100,000 refugees (mainly from Somalia) have resided for over a decade (Nolasco, 2017). 
This has added to the sense of the region being ‘ungoverned’, raising questions about who is 
and who is not considered to be Kenyan (Whittaker, 2017). 
Cross-border clan identities also play a significant role in conflict dynamics and conflict 
spillover. The Mandera Triangle, for example, is a geographical region in the Horn of Africa 
where Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia converge. The tri-border area is inhabited almost entirely by 
Somali communities. The Garre and Degodia clans are known to live side by side in Ethiopia, as 
well as in Kenya’s Mandera and Wajir Counties; while the Marehan and Garre clans live together 
in Somalia (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017). Conflicts spillover from one country to another, and from 
one county to another, such as the conflict in 2016 between Garre and Degodia communities that 
originated in Ethiopia, then spread to Mandera County and onwards into Wajir County (NCIC & 
Interpeace, 2017). These cross-border conflicts have become particularly challenging with the 
greater availability of modern weapons, which has also led to the gradual erosion of customary 
conflict mitigation institutions (Nolasco, 2017). In addition, the legacy of prior conflicts continues 
to undermine stability. In Rhamu town in Mandera County, for example, the main market has 
been split into two parts, one for the Degodia and the other for the Garre (NCIC & Interpeace, 
2017). Ongoing political contestation between the Garre and the Degodia in Mandera also 
contributes to violent clashes. While some respondents find that the numerical dominance of the 
Garre in Mandera County gives them an advantage in the realms of governance, resource 
allocation and economic wellbeing, many Garre claim to face deliberate exclusion from jobs in 
the majority-Degodia County of Wajir. This has produced a cycle of accusations and counter-
accusations (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017). For further discussion, see the County sub-sections 
under Counties in North Eastern Kenya.  
Conflict between cross-border communities and actions of any of the bordering national 
governments have social, economic, political and security implications for cross-border 
clans (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017). There seems, however, to be a lack of a coordinated approach 
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between Kenya, Somalia, and Ethiopia on issues of peace, security, trade, and the movement of 
people across the borders (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017).  
For further discussion, see Cross-border clans under Actors and County profiles. 
Devolution dynamics 
The broad aim of devolution is to bring government closer to the people and to address 
problems of historical marginalisation and alienation of certain regions and groups by 
providing them with access to political power and development resources (Cannon & Ali, 2018; 
NCIC & Interpeace, 2017; Mkutu et al., 2014). This is also considered necessary to promote 
social cohesion and to reduce the incidence of violence arising from marginalisation and the 
politicisation of ethnicity (Scott-Villiers, 2017). The 2010 Constitution has been upheld as one of 
the most progressive pieces of legislation in the world (Nolasco, 2017). It includes provisions to 
secure the rights of traditionally marginalised groups, including women and youth, and to 
promote democratic governance through devolution. Devolution can also raise consciousness 
regarding direct involvement in the management of resources at the local level and the right of 
communities to manage their own affairs (Scharrer, 2018; Cannon & Ali, 2018). The prior 
centralised system of governance had largely concentrated development projects in certain 
regions of the country, with Nairobi and surrounding areas receiving the vast majority of revenue 
allocation (Cannon & Ali, 2018).  
The outcomes of devolution have thus far been mixed, with benefits including a strong 
counterbalance to the centre, greater political power to Kenyan Somalis, and much larger 
resource allocation to the marginalised areas (Cannon & Ali, 2018). The formation of county 
governments and governors willing to assert independence from the centre and to defend county 
interests has provided a more robust counter to the centre (Lind, 2018). In addition, officials 
elected in 2013 included a large number of Kenyan Somalis, some assuming important positions 
in parliament and government (Scharrer, 2018). Devolution has also resulted in the allocation of 
resources to Kenya’s counties in the periphery on a scale and with regularity never experienced 
before (Cannon & Ali, 2018). The 47 county governments control about 30% of national revenue. 
Mandera County receives the third largest budget of devolved funds after Nairobi and Turkana 
Counties due to its underdevelopment, lack of infrastructure and high poverty index (NCIC & 
Interpeace, 2017). 
Devolution has brought national resources closer to the people, while also intensifying 
local rivalries and inter-clan competition for political seats, perceived as guaranteed 
access to economic resources by ‘winning’ clans to the disadvantage of ‘losing’ clans (NCIC & 
Interpeace, 2017; Carrier & Kochore, 2014). The post of county governor, created under 
devolution, gives much power to incumbents at a regional level. This increased the stakes for 
clans to win not just a constituency, but also the county gubernatorial position, for control of 
territory and economy (Lind et al., 2015; Carrier & Kochore, 2014). Candidates have aimed at 
maximising the numbers of their own group, either by registering ‘their’ voters in their area, or by 
driving others out, a strategy that began during colonial times (Scharrer, 2018). In Mandera 
County, for example, voter transfer has become a common way of winning, with allegations that 
both the Garre and Degodia communities were involved in mass voter transfer during the 2013 
General Elections (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017).  
The persistent ethnicisation of politics, now also at the county level, has undermined the 
intent of devolution to accommodate different interest groupings and address 
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marginalisation as important drivers of political violence (Lind, 2018; Carrier & Kochore, 2014). 
Rather, it has allowed for the replication of familiar patronage politics, governing the distribution 
of goods, rights and responsibilities, at the sub-national level (D’Arcy & Nistotskaya, 2019; Lind, 
2018; Scott-Villiers, 2017; International Alert, 2016; ICG, 2015). Politicians and the elite play a 
significant role in fanning the conflict (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017). CoEs have also been prominent 
in some cases in attempts to mobilise voters along ethnic and clan lines (Carrier & Kochore, 
2014).  
Previously marginalised groups at the national level have come to dominate at the county 
level, which has led in some cases to the marginalisation of minority clans within the 
county – and the potential for new conflict (Lind, 2018; NCIC & Interpeace, 2017; Mkutu et 
al., 2014). There is evidence of discrimination and hostility against those perceived to be 
‘outsiders’. Governors have been accused of skewed appointments that have benefited those 
who voted for him or her, which has marginalised minorities (Mkutu et al., 2014). In Mandera 
County, for example, resource sharing tends to favour the big clans, who rely on their numerical 
advantage to maintain a status of privilege (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017). The Garre-led clan 
coalition that formed the 2013 – 2017 County Government has been accused of enjoying the 
benefits of devolution to the exclusion of the Degodia and Corner Tribes, in particular isolating 
the Mandera North constituency that is populated primarily by the Degodia (NCIC & Interpeace, 
2017). The Controversies over resource sharing in Mandera County is linked to the case in the 
adjacent Wajir County, which has also been accused of denying services and resources to Garre 
population, which are the minority in the county (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017). In Garissa County 
too, there are reports that devolution has exacerbated clan divisions, with greater emphasis 
placed on clannism than on meritocracy for county positions (Mkutu et al., 2014). Such 
perceptions of skewed resource allocation and new forms of exclusion of minority groups raise 
the potential for inter-clan conflict (Lind, 2018; NCIC & Interpeace, 2017).  
In order for devolution to achieve its original aims, county governments need to work 
hard in the interests of all their people, not just those of their own ethnic backers (Carrier 
& Kochore, 2014). In Wajir County, which avoided the communal conflicts that followed the vote 
in Mandera and Garissa, elected officer positions were carefully apportioned based on a pre-
election agreement in order to ensure representation of all clans. The governor was also 
commended for fairly distributing jobs and resources (Lind, 2018; ICG, 2015). For further 
discussion, see Devolution, constitutional reform and local government under Sources of 
Resilience. 
Higher levels of corruption at the local level is another unintended consequence of 
devolution, alongside the replication of ethnicised patronage politics (Cannon & Ali, 2018; 
Lind, 2018). Most county governments have been accused of gross irregularities, including 
fraudulent activities, misappropriation of funds, payroll manipulation, nepotism, and procurement 
malpractice (Cannon & Ali, 2018). Research and reports issued by the Office of the Controller of 
Budget reveal that money earmarked for electrification, water supplies, dams, and sewerage or 
other goods appears to have been misappropriated, misspent, returned to Nairobi, or simply 
disappeared (Cannon & Ali, 2018). In the North East, many residents point to the corruption and 
mismanagement of county government, and the Office of the Auditor-General has raised serious 
issues of misappropriation of devolved funds across the three counties (ICG, 2015). In Mandera 
County, for example, the accrual of substantial funds and political power since devolution has not 
led to expected advancements in economic development. Evidence indicates the funds have 
been misused or returned which has further undermined the already dire health care system 
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(Cannon & Ali, 2018). Problems with corruption predate devolution and are exacerbated by the 
lack of effective anti-corruption mechanisms in Kenya (Cannon & Ali, 2018). Further, the police 
themselves, necessary for prosecutions and investigations of corruption, are in some cases also 
highly corrupt (Cannon & Ali, 2018). For discussion about corruption in the security sector, see 
Security issues below. 
Hate speech 
Incitement by politicians, local elites and mainstream and community media is a key 
feature in the majority of prior conflicts in Kenya, contributing to the escalation of tensions 
(Nolasco, 2017). Hate speech is defined in Kenya as “speech that advocates or encourages 
violent acts against a specific group, and creates a climate of hate or prejudice, which may in 
turn foster the commission of hate crimes” (see Scott-Villiers, 2017, p. 257). Methods of 
incitement range from malicious cell-phone text messages to the denigration of individual political 
actors (Nolasco, 2017). Ordinary citizens, in turn, have contributed to incitement of ethnic 
divisions by joining an ethnic voting bloc, often feeling that they are likely to lose less if their 
ethnic group gains power (Scott-Villiers, 2017). Hate speech has been less of an issue in 
Northern Kenya, although its effects may be felt nation-wide, particularly during election time. 
Further, there are specific reports of politicians inciting clans in Mandera County during election 
time, with abusive and derogatory statements about rival clans (Mohamed & Warfa, 2019). 
Despite progress in countering hate speech, politics in Kenya remains divided along 
ethnic lines (Nolasco, 2017). The NCIC, formed in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 electoral 
violence with the aim of enhancing social cohesion in Kenya, has played a key role in preventing 
hate speech. It has achieved this by creating awareness, monitoring social media, and 
investigating and initiating court cases, however, challenges remain. This is evident in the 
absence of successful prosecutions, particularly of those who are politically well-connected, 
which can contribute to social acceptance of expressions of hate (Nolasco, 2017).  
While mainstream and community media have often been criticised for their divisive role 
in incitement, they can and have played constructive roles, particularly in the aftermath of 
the 2007-2008 election violence (Maweu, 2019). For further discussion, see Media under 
Sources of Resilience. 
Security issues 
While political power and national resources have been subject to devolution, the national 
government retains responsibility for security, with intensifying militarisation in some cases 
(Lind, 2018). There are arguments for and against the devolution of security, including in the 
North Eastern counties. Clan capture of county governments and their potential to contribute to, 
or cause, conflict supports the continuance of a neutral national administrative and security 
presence (ICG, 2015). At the same time, however, the national government tends to be 
inconsistent in its efforts to resolve inter-clan conflict (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017). Mixed 
initiatives, involving locally recruited security forces led by nationally trusted and experienced 
professionals from the same community are producing results (ICG, 2015). In Mandera County, 
for example, many people support the retention of security as a function of the national 
government, but they are uncomfortable with the lack of local representation (NCIC & Interpeace, 
2017). Intelligence officers posted to Mandera are mostly drawn from other parts of the country. 
Due to cultural differences and linguistic limitations, they often find themselves unable to 
integrate with the local community and gather useful information (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017). For 
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further discussion, see Strengthened security arrangements and police-civilian trust under 
Sources of Resilience. 
Communities in the North East of Kenya have low levels of trust in security institutions 
due to inadequate provision of security services, alleged police corruption and a history 
of heavy-handed security operations and atrocities committed against residents of the 
region (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017; International Alert, 2016). At the same time, trust in law 
enforcement is essential for the belief in the legitimacy of law enforcement or a sense of 
obligation to obey the law and adhere to decisions made by legal authorities (Botha & Abdile, 
2020). In the absence of trust in the police and cooperation, the police would have to resort to 
other tactics, such as arresting witnesses or even worse, abuse – to initiate interaction with the 
public. This, in turn, is likely to further undermine perceptions of the police and solidify an 
uncooperative, hostile relationship (Botha & Abdile, 2020). Lack of trust in security institutions 
thus undermines the resilience of the communities against violence and radicalisation (NCIC & 
Interpeace, 2017; International Alert, 2016). 
Alongside, the blanket suspicion of local communities inhibits the ability of security 
officials to effectively secure the community and the willingness of residents to provide 
information (Botha & Abdile, 2020; NCIC & Interpeace, 2017). Communities in Mandera view 
the heavy presence of government security officers to keep the peace in Mandera as a form of 
‘collective punishment’, reminiscent of prior situations and part of ongoing grievances. Branding 
the people of Mandera as terrorists undermines the trust between the people and the security 
agencies under national control and the willingness of residents to provide intelligence to the 
police about crimes (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017). Individuals are often reluctant to come forward 
with information, for fear of being arrested themselves and harassed by security forces (Botha & 
Abdile, 2020; Pact & Mercy Corps, 2018). Further, the police often do not trust any information 
that they do receive and/or are easily bribed to release the suspects and reveal the identities of 
the witnesses. There are reported cases of whistleblowers and witnesses being killed by the 
suspects as a result (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017). 
Alleged corruption in the National Police Force and KDF, particularly cases of bribery, are 
considered an ‘enabler’ for extremism (Mongare, 2019). Police forces have been accused of 
receiving large amounts of money from terror suspects to enable them to easily gain entry into 
Kenya from Somalia; to gain national identity cards; and to escape prosecution through thwarted 
investigations (Mongare, 2019; Wakube et al., 2017). Police corruption at the border has also 
allowed for al-Shabaab to smuggle illegal goods, such as sugar, that are sold in Kenya. The 
United Nations and other reports reveal that goods pass through Garissa and the Port of 
Kismayu, passing police checkpoints unnoticed (Mongare, 2019). In the case of Mandera 
County, al-Shabaab are noted to easily cross over to Kenya by offering bribes to Kenyan and 
Ethiopian forces manning the border points and tax officials, particularly along trade routes such 
as El Wak, Rhamu and Bula Hawa (Mohamed & Warfa, 2019). There are also reports that 
outside of Kenya, the KDF have acted as brokers in the illegal trade of charcoal (Mongare, 
2019). Al-Shabaab exploits Kenya’s corruption and there are allegations of collusion among the 
police, military and al-Shabaab (Cannon & Pkalya, 2019). For further discussion, see the 
following section on Radicalisation and violent extremism.  
Corruption, inadequate policies and capacities of security agencies have heightened 
insecurity in communities in the North East and elsewhere, increasing the tendency 
towards self-defence, community arming and retaliation (Nolasco, 2017). The rise in attacks 
by al-Shabaab have exacerbated problems with lack of capacity, which the terrorist organisation 
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has capitalised upon (Nolasco, 2017; ICG, 2015). In Mandera County, for example, there were 
already few police posts, and in the wake of increased attacks, the government closed those with 
less than 40 officers (ICG, 2015).  
The national government’s failure to provide security is also attributed to corruption 
among security officials (Whittaker, 2015). This includes the involvement of corrupt security 
officials in the illicit trade of goods, such as sugar and cooking fat, from Somalia to Nairobi, which 
is reported to help fund al-Shabaab (Chome, 2016; Whittaker, 2015; Mkutu et al., 2014).  
There are also further problems with improper coordination between the various security 
agencies, in particular, tensions between the Kenya Police Service and the Kenya Police 
Reserve, on one hand, and between these police formations and the military on the other hand 
(NCIC & Interpeace, 2017). Poor coordination and relations between intelligence and policing 
departments have also been blamed for the failure to prevent terrorist attacks. The National 
Intelligence Service has been accused of not providing actionable information to the police 
services; and the police have been accused of not acting on intelligence they receive (Lind et al., 
2015).  
Small arms availability and misuse exacerbate security problems in Kenya, rendering 
communal conflict increasingly violent in recent years. The Mandera Triangle is reported to 
be a significant conduit for weapon shipments from the Middle East into Somalia and onwards to 
other parts of the African continent (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017). Widely available small arms, 
including automatic and semiautomatic weapons, are increasingly used along the borders of 
Kenya, rendering cattle raiding activities more violent and deadly and inter-clan conflict more 
aggressive (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017; Nolasco, 2017; Mkutu et al., 2014). This, in turn, makes 
conflict management and resolution more difficult (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017). While significant 
progress has been made in small arms reduction efforts since the 2007-2008 election violence, 
law enforcement efforts to control the proliferation of small arms continue to face considerable 
challenges (Nolasco, 2017). 
For further discussion, see Police and Military under Actors; Political and institutional factors 
under Root Causes; Radicalisation and violent extremism under Conflict dynamics; and 
Strengthened security arrangements and police-civilian trust under Sources of Resilience. 
Radicalisation and violent extremism 
While al-Shabaab remains focused on enforcing its variant of Islamic law in Somalia, it 
has long operated elsewhere in East Africa – and has drawn upon Kenya’s internal 
tensions and divisions to gain support (ICG, 2018; Lind et al., 2017). Al-Shabaab has 
exploited local grievances and regional cleavages, particularly in relation to uneven development 
patterns in Kenya and the treatment of its Muslim populations (Lind et al., 2017 and 2015; ICG, 
2015). A propaganda magazine - Gaidi Mtaani (‘Terrorist on the Street’), published in Swahili, for 
example, demonstrates an effective understanding of Kenya’s history and the particular concerns 
of its Muslim population (Anderson & McKnight, 2015). The terrorist organisation also produced a 
video that aimed to profile coastal and Somali grievances against the Kenyan state as evidence 
of a systematic alienation of Muslim interests in Kenya, with particular reference to shifta and 
state massacres in the North East (Chome, 2019). Where conversion through propaganda and 
drawing on pre-existing grievances has not been possible, it has used intimidation to compel 
community compliance (ICG, 2015). Expansionist by design, extremists have been successful in 
intimidating, marginalising and silencing moderate Muslim voices (Botha, 2013). 
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In rural and urban counties, youth unemployment and lack of sustainable livelihood 
opportunities are key challenges perceived to contribute to their recruitment into al-
Shabaab, which reportedly offers some form of economic or social good as an incentive to join 
(Anderson & McKnight, 2015; Mkutu et al., 2014). This is considered to be more often the case in 
towns close to the Somalia border with large refugee communities, which suffer greater 
challenges with economic deprivation (Anderson & McKnight, 2015). In these border-lands, even 
non-Muslim youths have been attracted by the financial offer and are converting to join al-
Shabaab (Mkutu et al., 2014). In Mandera County, for example, there are reports of some 
business tycoons hiring young people to protect their cross-border trade and/or luring young 
people with lucrative jobs in business, subsequently recruiting them to join al-Shabaab’s activities 
(Mohamed & Warfa, 2019). Further, al-Shabaab has supplied businesses with arms and helped 
them in securing their business interests in exchange for facilitating youth recruitment (Sahgal et 
al., 2019). For further discussion, see Business people under Conflict and resilience actors. 
Long-standing injustices and poor relations with the police, including ‘collective 
punishment’ and racial profiling, may also fuel radicalisation and violent extremism (Mkutu 
et al., 2014; Botha, 2013). Dissatisfaction on the part of Muslim youths in forms of ‘collective 
punishment’ by security forces and the labelling of all Muslims as terrorists or potential terrorists 
have in some cases pushed Muslim youths to join extremist groups (Botha, 2013).  
Lack of belonging and being made to feel like an ‘outsider’ could potentially render ethnic 
Somalis in Kenya vulnerable to al-Shabaab recruitment or sympathy with them (Kirui, 
2019). The feeling by ethnic Somalis in Kenya that their being Kenyan does not guarantee them 
stable citizenship or equal rights is a longstanding grievance (Kirui, 2019). This extends to non-
Somali Muslim groups in the North East (Kirui, 2019). The promotion of equal citizenship of 
Somalis and Muslims in Kenya is essential in itself, but may also help to ward off susceptibility to 
violent extremism within Kenya and in Somalia (Kirui, 2019; Anderson & McKnight, 2015).  
A key threat to stability in Kenya is if extremists succeed in their efforts to divide Muslims 
and non-Muslims, which has materialised to some extent following various al-Shabaab attacks 
targeting Christians (Anderson & McKnight, 2015; Botha, 2013). The attack that brought Kenya’s 
‘home-made’ terrorism into the open occurred at Garissa University in 2015, when an al-
Shabaab unit moved through the student dormitories killing any non-Muslims they encountered 
(Anderson & McKnight, 2015). Focus group discussions in Wajir and Garissa find that the rift 
between Muslims and Christians in the region has widened, with Christians being targeted by the 
terror groups and Muslims branded as sympathisers alongside a rise in Islamophobia (Botha & 
Abdile, 2020). Islamophobia has resulted in prejudice and heightened fear of Muslims, with 
hateful message circulated on social media against Muslims (Wesonga, 2017). Muslims thus 
often feel persecuted and targeted, once again collectively punished and presumed to be 
terrorists by security officers and other members of the public. This again undermines their 
willingness to come to the police with any relevant information (Botha & Abdile, 2020) 
The various attacks committed by al-Shabaab in the North East have also prompted an 
exodus of civil servants, with disastrous effects on services (ICG, 2015). This has included 
the mass exodus of Christian teachers and health workers not native to the area, drastically 
undermining the quality of education, health care and nutrition assistance in the region and 
exacerbating grievances over a lack of services (Abdille, 2019; ICG, 2015; HFTT, 2015). 
Secondary schools are most affected, but primary schools, especially along the Kenya–Somalia 
border, have also suffered from an inadequate number of teachers (HFTT, 2015). Locals have 
argued that their constitutional rights have been violated as they no longer have proper access to 
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education (REINVENT, 2020). Access to healthcare is limited by the closure of hundreds of 
health centres, due to a lack of staff (HFTT, 2015). In Mandera, for example, 11 of 26 health 
facilities closed in 2015 because staff left the County (HFTT, 2015). The government’s response 
to this services crisis has been weak, (ICG, 2015). Attacks against state services may provide 
support to the al-Shabaab narrative that the Government of Kenya continues to marginalise the 
North East, despite gains made under devolution (REINVENT, 2020). Such attacks have not 
been effective, however, in drawing residents toward extremism but in many cases have instead 
turned those affected against al-Shabaab as the exodus of workers has led to declines in 
services essential to everyday life (Yusaf, 2020).  
Robust evidence of al-Shabaab’s exploitation of clan-based conflicts for recruitment is 
limited, while some emergent research finds there is a complex relationship between the 
extremist group and clan conflicts (Karienye & Warfa, 2020; Rotich & Warfa, 2019; Sahgal et 
al., 2019). The Kenyan security forces remain focused on countering terrorism, often neglecting 
to address clan conflict. The two can be related, however. Factors that drive clan conflict also 
enable extremist activities (Karienye & Warfa, 2020). Recent research indicates that, as in 
Somalia, al-Shabaab exploits, misuses and controls clan disputes and clan dynamics to foster 
insecurity and advance their operations and activities in Kenya (Mohamed & Warfa, 2019; 
Sahgal et al., 2019; ICG, 2018). It is also possible that al-Shabaab’s strategy of fomenting 
division and polarisation could gain ground, with appeals to and recruitment of members of sub-
clans and clans that lose out politically (Wakube et al., 2017). In Mandera County, competition 
over resources, hostilities between elected officials, clan competition, and close cross-border 
clan ties, have enabled al-Shabaab to lure marginalised minority clans with employment 
opportunities in Somalia (Mohamed & Warfa, 2019; Sahgal et al., 2019). Attacks by al-Shabaab 
in specific towns in the County have also fuelled conflict at the clan level as each clan blames the 
other (Mohamed & Warfa, 2019). It is reported, for example, that al-Shabaab militias ambushed 
and killed two men and injured others in Dandu in Mandera West. The Garre clan alleged that 
the Degodia were behind the attack and, without further investigation, engaged in a counter-
attack against members of the Degodia clan, ambushing a car and killing six people, and injuring 
others (Mohamed & Warfa, 2019). This, in turn, led to the eruption of clan violence, despite an 
existing truce signed by the two communities in Mandera (Mohamed & Warfa, 2019).  
The securitisation of the government’s response to violent extremism has had the 
counter-productive outcome of fuelling radicalisation. The Kenyan government stepped up 
its military involvement in Somalia in 2011, in response to a series of attacks in Kenya by al-
Shabaab, its Kenyan affiliate al-Hijra or actors claiming proximity to these groups. The Kenyan 
security apparatus has also reacted with heavy-handed measures domestically, targeting in 
particular ethnic Somalis living in Kenya (Lind et al., 2017; Scharrer, 2018). This has included 
efforts to close refugee camps near the Somali border and crackdowns on Somali refugees living 
outside the camps, the biggest one taking place in 2014, called usalama watch (‘security watch’). 
By indiscriminately targeting its own Somali population through such incursions and with 
extended curfews, the Kenyan state has exacerbated grievances on the part of Kenyan Somalis 
and minority Muslims of being treated as ‘outsiders’ (Botha & Abdile, 2020; Chome, 2019; Lind et 
al., 2017). This can further reduce citizen’s trust in government institutions and weaken 
communal mechanisms of resilience, rendering individuals and communities more susceptible to 
radicalisation (International Alert, 2016; Whittaker, 2015). Al-Shabaab has also engaged in a 
series of retaliatory attacks after the incursion into Somalia, persistently targeting non-Muslims, 
claiming that they were a response to the non-Muslim occupation of Muslim territory (Scharrer, 
2018). At the same time, Kenyan Somalis and Muslims also feel exposed and deeply vulnerable 
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to terrorist violence (Botha & Abdile, 2020; Cannon & Pkalya, 2019; Chome, 2019; Lind et al., 
2017). This all occurs in the backdrop of areas that are underdeveloped, with historical 
grievances still unaddressed (Botha & Abdile, 2020).  
The Kenyan government’s 2011 incursion into Somalia also hampered the capacity of 
cross border mediation structures. Religious leaders, the business community, and local 
peace activists from Mandera, for example, had strongly lobbied the government against sending 
troops to Somalia, citing the likelihood of retaliatory attacks by al-Shabaab targeting civilians in 
Mandera and elsewhere in Kenya (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017). Some expressed their preference 
instead for pre-existing cross border peace initiatives (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017). Religious 
leaders and local peacebuilders found themselves in the aftermath suspected by both sides: on 
one hand, al-Shabaab declared them traitors and collaborators of the Kenyan government; on 
the other hand, some elements within the Kenyan government perceived them of being al-
Shabaab sympathisers (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017). Many religious leaders, despite their 
longstanding recognition as key agents for peace, have since taken a back seat for fear of being 
perceived as terror suspects, which has impeded a lot of voluntary engagement in peace work, 
especially in fighting radicalisation (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017). Alongside other countries in 
Africa, the KDF is planning for its exit from Somalia by the end of 2021 (Gisesa, 2020). 
Al-Shabaab’s recruitment and popular support in the North East are reported to have 
waned since 2015, although sporadic assaults continue, picking up further since the end 
of 2019. These include attacks on police stations and on ‘non-local’ (mainly Christian) public 
servants, including teachers (ICG, 2018). In addition, militancy in Kenya, which in places 
predates al-Shabaab’s involvement, can be expected to persist so long as grievances remain 
(ICG, 2018). A significant spike in militant activity in December 2019 has continued into 2020 
(REINVENT, 2020). Between December 2019 and April 2020, at least 38 people were killed in 14 
clashes and incidents in the border counties of Garissa, Lamu, Mandera, and Wajir (Yusuf, 
2020). Those killed have included security forces, government officials, and commuters killed in 
gun and bomb attacks (Yusuf, 2020). 
Hardships and resource re-allocations related to the COVID-19 pandemic may create an 
enabling environment for militant activity to further take hold. The Kenyan government and 
civil society organisations have shifted their focus and resources from countering radicalisation 
and violent extremism to containing the pandemic (Mohamed, et al., 2020). The government, for 
example, has redirected security forces, media and budgets to COVID-19 awareness, monitoring 
and prevention. KDF forces have also been downsized or called away from patrolling the borders 
to enforce social distancing and curfew in Nairobi, increasing the risk of insecurity in border 
towns  (Mohamed, et al., 2020). At the same time, the brutal force that security forces are 
reported to have exerted in some cases in enforcing COVID-19 security measures, have 
undermined trust in security forces and perpetuated grievances. Alongside losses in 
opportunities for youth, who may not be able to access digital learning during the pandemic, this 
can increase the pool of youth vulnerable to extremist messaging and recruitment (Mohamed, et 
al., 2020; HRW, 2020). 
For discussion on counter violent extremism and radicalisation initiatives, see Countering violent 
extremism in Strengthened security arrangements under Sources of Resilience. 
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7. Sources of resilience 
Devolution, constitutional reform and local government 
Despite the various challenges and unintended negative consequences, the devolution of 
powers and resources to sub-national county governments remains one of the most 
promising ways in which to prevent conflict in the North East (Lind et al., 2015). It does so 
by redressing regional inequalities and historic marginalisation; giving greater political 
prominence to areas previously considered to be the periphery; and providing the possibility of 
accommodating different interest groups in new governance structures (Lind et al., 2015). 
North Eastern Kenya moved from the political periphery to being of national importance in 
the 2013 elections; and the role of ethnic Somalis in politics gained momentum, raising 
the prospect of shedding their ‘outsider’ tag (Kirui, 2019; Carrier & Kochore, 2014). This was 
due in part to the changed mode of the presidential election at the national level, which 
introduced new competitive elements, whereby the successful candidate must secure 25% of 
votes in more than half of the counties. This transformed the North East from an area long 
considered peripheral to Kenyan politics into a ‘swing’ region, with large interest from presidential 
candidates and their parties (Scharrer, 2018; Lind et al., 2015; Carrier & Kochore, 2014). 
National figures were seen on the campaign trail in Garissa and Mandera, among other Northern 
towns (Carrier & Kochore, 2014). Political parties wooed Somali voters with the promise of 
strategic government jobs once in power (Kirui, 2019). While the increased role of Kenyan 
Somalis in national politics may be mere political bait to attract votes from the North East, it offers 
an opportunity for ethnic Somalis to shed their ‘outsider’ tag and to be recognised as equal 
citizens (Kirui, 2019; Scharrer, 2018). The ascent of Kenyan Somalis to top positions in the 
Kenyan government, which has increased ruling party reliance on Kenyan Somalis as reliable 
allies, is one of the most dramatic and positive political developments in the North East in the 
past couple of decades (Menkhaus, 2015).  
The establishment of county-level administrations responsible for spending a significant 
proportion of government funds have enabled the expansion of the state-building process 
into previously marginalised areas of the country (Mosley & Watson, 2016). Addressing this 
history of marginalisation has the potential to improve not only state-society relations, but also 
inter-community relations in a way that produces greater resilience (International Alert, 2016). 
The Constitution also specifically provides for a separate ‘Equalisation Fund’, allowing more large 
and medium scale interventions to improve service delivery in marginalised, pastoral areas – 
including Mandera, Wajir and Garissa (Nolasco, 2017). The aim is to reduce pastoral conflicts 
and spark a wave of public investment that will hasten development in the pastoralist counties 
and ensure equity in national development (Nolasco, 2017). Disbursements under the 
Equalisation Fund have been minimal, however, delayed by various political and bureaucratic 
obstacles.6 
                                                   
6 See: Guleid, M. (2018). How the new equalisation policy will push the poor deeper into poverty. 5 July. The 
Standard. https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001286727/how-the-new-equalisation-policy-will-push-the-
poor-deeper-into-poverty. Mutai, E. (2020). MPs eye bigger role in equalisation cash. 5 June. Business Daily. 
https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/news/counties/MPs-eye-bigger-role-in-equalisation-cash/4003142-5570860-
g5be8gz/index.html   
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Devolution has contributed to the redress of local grievances about political, social and 
economic exclusion (ICG, 2018). Local authorities, controlling millions of dollars in annual 
budgets, have proven better able to tackle issues such as unemployment and service delivery 
(ICG, 2015). Devolution of resources can also allow for inclusive local development plans that 
integrate marginalised regions into the national economy and allow for local-level stakeholder 
involvement in the processes (International Alert, 2016). Devolved county governments now also 
have significant resources at the local level to invest in climate adaptation strategies and 
community mobilisation and participation in development (Njoka et al., 2016). Devolution likewise 
has reduced Muslim complaints about being governed from a remote, Christian-dominated 
centre (ICG, 2018). By addressing grievances, devolution has also undercut support for al-
Shabaab in the North East and Coastal regions (ICG, 2018). 
Locally elected officials in county government, with better local knowledge and greater 
local legitimacy than politicians from other counties, are well placed to address conflicts 
and promote peace (Menkhaus, 2015; Mkutu et al., 2014). In Garissa County, for example, the 
county governor has supported peace initiatives and cooperated with other governors to resolve 
long-standing conflicts with neighbouring counties of Wajir, Isiolo and Lamu. The county 
government has also deployed religious leaders, elders, and peace committees to resolve or 
prevent instability in the county (Mkutu et al., 2014). County governments are also well placed to 
strengthen and implement existing peace pacts and agreements, in partnership with the national 
government, such as the Modogashe Declaration of 2001 and the Abdalla-Abudwak peace 
accord of 2010 between two Somali clans in Garissa County (Mkutu et al., 2014). For discussion 
on the neglect of peace infrastructures at the local level, however, see the section on Peace 
Committees under Sources of Resilience. 
Devolved government structures require adequate skills and capacities, effective 
structures to connect representatives of county governments and national government, 
and proper oversight, in order to function effectively (Chome, 2016). These linkages will help 
counties, such as Mandera and Garissa, to strengthen the capacity of local governance 
structures but also to build their legitimacy with local communities (Chome, 2016). The USAID-
funded Agile Harmonized Assistance for Devolved Institutions, for example, which aims to 
strengthen the benefits of devolution, should seek to encourage the participation of youth and 
women in local governance and to promote cooperation between county and national 
governments in addressing the drivers of conflict and violent extremism in the region (Chome, 
2016). It could also contribute to support for cooperation between national and county 
governments necessary for improved county policing and management of local security (Chome, 
2016). 
The new sub-national wrangling and ethnic and inter-clan competition and tensions that 
devolution inadvertently produced at county levels needs to be addressed (Lind, 2018; 
NCIC & Interpeace, 2017). In order to counter this tension and potential for violence, county 
elites must be more inclusive of minorities, cooperate across local boundaries for inter-county 
peace and recognise the continued role for neutral national institutions (ICG, 2015). They also 
need to take advantage of opportunities to engage in a coordinated manner with local political 
elites, young people and religious leaders, among others, who can help build the relationships 
required for resilience (International Alert, 2016). County governments need to identify 
interventions to address inter- and intra-clan conflicts, and to strengthen platforms for clan-level 
dialogue for conflict resolution, working with various sources of resilience at the community level 
(Sahgal et al., 2019). 
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Citizenship, social cohesion and social contract 
Infrastructure, services and the social contract 
The attention of Kenya’s governing elite has recently shifted to the economic potential of 
the Northern regions, evident in the national development plan, Kenya Vision 2030, which 
gives a prominent role to infrastructure that connects periphery areas to the centre. For 
most of the history of Kenya, colonial and post-colonial, Northern Kenya was viewed from Nairobi 
as a marginally productive zone, serving primarily as a buffer between the rest of Kenya and 
Somali inhabited regions (Mosley & Watson, 2016). A fundamental part of this marginalisation 
has been the underdevelopment of infrastructure, particularly roads (Kochore, 2016). Kenya’s 
national development plan, Kenya Vision 2030, gives a prominent role to infrastructure like 
roads, railways and pipelines, connecting more remote regions to the centre and bringing 
development and transformation (Kochore, 2016). It involves opening up remote areas and 
regions previously neglected or closed off from the nation to new economic opportunities 
(Kochore, 2016). 
Infrastructure is a way of fundamentally altering not only development opportunities for 
populations in the North but also their identities. Due to a history of marginalisation, people 
in Northern Kenya have not imagined themselves as being part of the nation (Kochore, 2016). 
The Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) corridor project, for example, which 
aims to connect regions in the periphery, including Northern Kenya, through road infrastructure, 
has inherent symbolic and political resonance for the state and its citizens (Kochore, 2016). 
There have, however, been issues with aspects of large-scale developments in Kenya, in terms 
of concerns over environmental impact and inadequate community consultation and involvement 
(Mosley & Watson, 2016). For further discussion, see the section on Traditional elders and 
Council of Elders. 
Alongside infrastructure and security, national and county governments also need to 
urgently re-establish social services, especially health and education. Low levels of literacy 
and numeracy have been linked with the propensity for radicalisation in the North East of Kenya 
(Nolasco, 2017). At the same time, extremist attacks have weakened social services, with 
exoduses of non-local workers (see Radicalisation and violent extremism under Conflict 
dynamics). Education can help to reduce poverty and to promote integration among ethnic and 
religious groups (ICG, 2015). Extending both primary and secondary education, and improving 
the quality of such education, can help children and youth to develop critical thinking to challenge 
radical and violent extremist ideology (Nolasco, 2017). Such programmes need to be combined 
with outreach to ensure that the most vulnerable groups are targeted and encouraged to attend 
and/or that mechanisms are in place to address the obstacles to their attendance (Nolasco, 
2017).  
Alongside improvements in infrastructure that connect regions and groups long 
considered to be in the periphery, improvements in communication technology can 
improve state-society relations (Kirui, 2019). Through mobile phones, for example, the state 
can interact with society even in remote villages in the North East of Kenya. In order to be 
effective, however, the Kenyan state has to change its narratives about Somalis as ‘outsiders’ in 
order to gain their trust and support (Kirui, 2019). 
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Peaceful coexistence, social cohesion and diversity 
The NCIC has played a key role in countering hate speech (Nolasco, 2017; NCIC & 
Interpeace, 2017). While hate speech has been an issue mostly in Southern Kenya, the NCIC’s 
guidance applies nation-wide - to journalists and media outlets, concerning responsible 
journalism and on conducting awareness training regarding hate speech. It also warns 
perpetrators that they would be held accountable should they violate the National Cohesion and 
Integration Commission Act, investigates and hears complaints regarding hate speech, and 
initiates prosecutions (Nolasco, 2017; NCIC, 2018). There has been an absence of successful 
prosecutions, however (Nolasco, 2017). The NCIC has also forged partnerships with social 
media players to minimise online hate (NCIC, 2018). For further discussion, see Hate speech 
under Conflict dynamics. 
Alongside the monitoring of hate speech, peace messaging peaked in Kenya around the 
2013 election and is considered to have contributed to lower levels of electoral violence in 
Kenya (Lynch et al., 2019). The electoral violence that these initiatives sought to address applied 
primarily to Southern Kenya, which suffered from the 2007-2008 post-election violence. A vast 
range of entities called for peace, including media houses and journalists trained in conflict-
sensitive reporting; theatre groups and musicians; public advertising; and politicians (Lynch et al., 
2019). Peace messages were disseminated using various methods, including SMS (text 
message) blasts, fliers, radio, TV, billboards, training journalists on peace messaging, comic 
books, national TV shows and local engagement of community-based groups (Lynch et al., 
2019). While the rise of peace messaging has been internally driven, it has often been externally 
funded through peace programmes supported by a range of international actors (Lynch et al., 
2019). 
An emphasis on peace campaigning can be problematic, however, as it may strengthen 
authoritarianism and facilitate the emergence of a ‘peaceocracy’, in which the fear of conflict 
is used to elevate stability and order over democracy (Lynch et al., 2019). The peace narrative 
around Kenya’s 2013 and 2017 elections undermined the capacity of the media to speak freely. It 
was also used to legitimate an unconstitutional ban on political meetings and demonstrations that 
were considered a threat to peace, and to justify heavy-handed security responses to protests 
(Lynch et al., 2019). 
Citizenship and unity in shared goals 
Resilience factors that bring communities together include the creation of new narratives 
of collaboration and Kenyan citizenship through joint local initiatives to achieve mutual 
goals and practical help (International Alert, 2016). In Mandera County, for example, while clans 
have conflicts among themselves, the common problems of underdevelopment, insecurity, 
political manipulation, environmental challenges and terror attacks often become a unifying factor 
(NCIC & Interpeace, 2017). The scale of the Garre-Degodia conflict of 2010-2014 was lowered 
due to the various attacks by al-Shabaab on the local population. Common problems like drought 
have also at times provided opportunities for the community to work together to resolve the 
challenges, rendering their divisions less salient (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017). A number of 
interventions in the North East, for example, have focused on working to cope jointly with 
environmental shocks such as drought and flooding, common in pastoral areas. Existing 
programmes, such as the World Bank-funded Regional Pastoral Livelihoods Resilience Project, 
have encouraged the establishment of pastoral and agro-pastoral cooperative societies among 
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the communities they work with, which have the potential to foster inter-clan engagement and 
social capital (Chome, 2016). Kenya Tuna Uwezo (Kiswahili for “We have the power!”), 
supported by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), uses a ‘people to 
people approach’ to initiate dialogue on shared concerns and to create clear, mutually-beneficial 
action plans. It involves the engagement of youth, women and community leaders, for example in 
community-based activities and partnerships to address common challenges, such as violent 
extremism (Nolasco, 2017).  
Shared public spaces can also bring different clan communities together and foster unity. 
In villages in Mandera County, for example, members of the local community share common 
utilities and public spaces like markets, schools, and hospitals despite coming from different 
clans (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017). In the Mandera- Belet Hawa cross border corridor, the Garre, 
Marehan, Murulle, Degodia and Corner Tribe communities have used the Mandera community 
centre for cross border dialogue meetings (USAID et al., 2013). The Buruburu primary school in 
Mandera is also attended by children from all communities from both sides of the border, which 
improves mutual interaction and cooperation amongst the cross-border communities (USAID et 
al., 2013). In Belet Hawa, all communities frequent the same market facilities, which has become 
a central part of the conflict early warning system as information is exchanged there on a regular 
basis (USAID et al., 2013). The effective functioning of these facilities is considered to be one of 
the most important issues that brings everyone together (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017). These 
facilities also have local committees, such as the Parent Teacher Association and the Water 
User Association, which comprise members of the various clans that live in the area, and thus 
share a common vision of improving the services rendered to the public, even during adverse 
conflict periods (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017). In Wajir, community centres and youth resource 
centres are often used for cross border peace dialogue meetings and meetings of peace 
organisations and networks. They also provide a space for youth to engage in drama, sports, 
library services, and income-generating activities (USAID et al., 2013) 
The idea of Kenya as a nation of diversity has been fostered in popular culture and in 
educational programming. Cultural endeavours include in music (e.g. the song “Narudi 
yumbani”/“coming home” by Nameless, written in 2010 as a tribute to Kenyan sportspeople who 
“represent [their] nation”), advertisements (such as “Niko na Safaricom”/“I have Safaricom”, a 
mobile network operator in Kenya) and TV shows (Scharrer, 2018) (for further discussion, see 
the section on Media). Since inception, the NCIC has also implemented educational programmes 
aimed at the promotion of national values and a Kenyan identity to accelerate the unity of the 
diverse communities (NCIC, 2018). In partnership with primary and secondary schools, 
universities and colleges, the Commission has incorporated peace sensitisation and training 
programmes into the school curriculums that emphasise national values, cohesion and 
integration (NCIC, 2018). 
Shared cultural values can also be unifying, cutting across religion and clan lineages, and 
may be a contributing factor to the absence of full-blown violence between religious 
communities in Kenya (Wesonga, 2017). Kenya is unique in that despite terror attacks on 
Christian establishments, the country has never experienced large-scale violence between 
Muslims and Christians (Wesonga, 2017). This could be attributed to commonality in some 
cultural beliefs, such as African Ubuntu philosophy, from which the national motto Harambee, 
meaning ‘pulling together’ – working toward the same goal, derives. It rallies all Kenyans to join 
in fighting poverty, disease and illiteracy, and Ubuntu enshrines essential human virtues, 
compassion and humanity to others, precursors to the respect of human life irrespective of 
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diverse faith backgrounds (Wesonga, 2017). Harambee is rooted in the tenets of African 
hospitality, which is crucial in Christian–Muslim relations in Kenya since it reminds the adherents 
of the faiths that they should love one another because of their shared African identity and 
philosophy (Wesonga, 2017).  
Guaranteeing equal citizenship rights for all Kenyans is a fundamental component of a 
wider peacebuilding approach that could ameliorate state–society and inter-community 
tensions (Lind et al., 2017). It could, in turn, reduce the al-Shabaab threat (Lind et al., 2017). 
The fair issuance of Kenyan identity documents, which are a necessity for participation in the 
legal aspects of citizenship, to Kenyan Somalis, Muslims and women, who have been subject to 
precarious citizenship, should be a priority (Scharrer, 2018; International Alert, 2016). This could 
be done alongside a widespread demonstration of the importance of citizenship and its 
corresponding rights and obligations (International Alert, 2016). 
Strengthened security arrangements and police-civilian trust 
Police-civilian trust-building 
Building police-civilian trust and positive police-civilian relations, which can enable 
effective partnerships between the police and the public, is fundamental to conflict 
prevention and peacebuilding in North East Kenya (Botha & Abdile, 2020; Nolasco, 2017; Mkutu 
et al., 2014; USAID et al., 2013). Fostering trust between ethnic Somalis and Kenya’s security 
apparatus is essential in building the sense of belonging and ownership that can help ward off 
attempts at destabilisation by various factions within Kenya and in Somalia (Kirui, 2019). 
Trust-building can also facilitate information gathering and the early detection of 
extremist activity and other criminal acts (Botha & Abdile, 2020; Nolasco, 2017). Since a 
common perception is that police officers do not respond to information provided or, even worse, 
may end up targeting those who provide the information, any indications of failure to give the 
necessary and appropriate attention to information provided must be addressed (Botha & Abdile, 
2020; Nolasco, 2017).  
In order to build better relationships with the neighbourhoods they serve, police officers 
need to reduce their use of aggressive tactics and acknowledge prior atrocities committed 
by security forces (Botha & Abdile, 2020; International Alert, 2016). These actions, along with 
efforts to improve accountability, can further contribute to trust-building and to re-establishing the 
social contract in North East Kenya (International Alert, 2016). This involves various actions, 
including publicly accepting IPOA investigations that have identified heavy-handed policing and 
committing to work with communities to avoid such events in the future (International Alert, 
2016). At the national level, IPOA has been involved in monthly radio programmes to discuss its 
own mandate, police accountability, and to increase rights awareness (Beston, 2018). For further 
discussion on the acknowledgement of atrocities, see the section on Transitional justice. 
Trust-building can also be enhanced by security forces that are more rooted in local 
communities and can better understand and reflect local populations. Security agents have 
tended to come from outside the local areas, lacking familiarity with the culture and customs of 
local communities (Pact & Mercy Corps, 2018). North Eastern county leaders pressed for greater 
control over security, and for security forces that would better reflect the local population, after 
significant acts of violence in Garissa and Mandera in 2013 and 2014 (ICG, 2015). They 
recommended the appointment of an overarching regional coordinator and deployment of more 
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security forces drawn from the local population. After initial resistance from the national 
government, the president appointed Mohamud Saleh in the North East as regional coordinator 
in 2015 and established a remodelled ‘locally sensitive’ security apparatus, though still under 
national command (ICG, 2018 and 2015). An Ogaden Somali who played a role in ending the 
shifta war, Saleh commanded much respect (Wakube et al., 2017). 
The deployment of local, Muslim, ethnic Somali security officials to lead operations in the 
North East is reported to have built trust in the security services as residents see locally 
rooted offices as more responsive to their concerns (ICG, 2018). This, in turn, has also improved 
intelligence gathering (ICG, 2018). During Saleh’s three-year role as regional commissioner, the 
number of attacks in the North East, particularly in the regional hub of Garissa and also in Wajir 
and Mandera town, fell markedly. This is attributed primarily to improved trust in the security 
leadership and the decline in fear of being accused of collusion with al-Shabaab when sharing 
information (Mohamed & Warfa, 2019; ICG, 2018). It is also attributed to the greater 
understanding of Saleh and other top security personnel of Somali origin of local clan dynamics 
of the Somali communities (Mohamed & Warfa, 2019). Saleh transcended clan divisions and 
helped to restore relations among national and county security agencies and communities 
(Wakube et al., 2017). Al-Shabaab’s recruitment and popular support in the North East are also 
reported to have subsided since 2015, due in part to improved security arrangements (ICG, 
2018).  
While appointing police officers who know and understand the community well is 
considered to enhance police legitimacy, there is also a concern that this could 
encourage favouritism and corruption (Botha & Abdile, 2020). A potential solution can be to 
rotate officers within the station or between stations in the same geographical area on a regular 
basis. Further, an environment should be fostered whereby commanders and other officers can 
come forward with information regarding abuse and the misuse of powers of colleagues to a 
separate command tasked with investigating these allegations (Botha & Abdile, 2020). 
Trust-building between youth and security officers is particularly important, as poor 
treatment of youth by security personnel is a frequently cited driver of recruitment into 
violent groups, according to various research reports (Pact & Mercy Corps, 2018). Creating the 
space for engagement and dialogue between these two groups, in contrast to confrontation, can 
build the confidence of young people, foster trust and relationships and possibly change 
perceptions of the other (Pact & Mercy Corps, 2018). Participants at USAID’s PEACE III trust-
building events find that while youth still face various challenges, such as accessing ID cards, 
low representation in formal peace structures and low employment in border areas, there has 
been a marked improvement in youth and security personnel relations since the start of the 
programme’s interventions (Pact & Mercy Corps, 2018). Other ways in which to improve 
relationships include sports competitions, community works, regular feedback forums, and 
cultural events (Pact & Mercy Corps, 2018). In Rhamu town in Mandera County, for example, 
where communities have long had poor relations with the local police force, friendly soccer 
matches between the local youth and police have helped to improve relations (Pact & Mercy 
Corps, 2018). The matches have helped to build trust between the youth and police and to 
change perceptions of the ‘other’, with youth increasingly viewed as contributors to peacebuilding 
efforts, rather than trouble makers. Youth have supported police efforts by jointly organising night 
patrols and promptly reporting any incidents of conflict, such that they can be addressed quickly 
to avoid escalation (Pact & Mercy Corps, 2018). 
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Police forces also need to be representative and reflective of women and their needs. In 
Mandera, a group of women formed a sub-county Gender Technical Working Group, with 
support from a DFID-funded programme aimed at increasing safety and security for communities 
in Kenya. The group has lobbied the police station about the absence of a female gender desk 
officer and accompanied survivors of sexual and gender-based violence to court and ensured the 
justice process was completed (resulting in convictions) (Beston, 2018). Efforts are also needed 
to strengthen the ‘demand’ side of services by increasing women and girls’ awareness of their 
rights and on reporting VAWG to the police (Beston, 2018). Different approaches have been 
piloted in schools and other ‘safe spaces’ to build trust in the police and awareness around 
reporting, such as in Girls and Boys clubs in Wajir (Beston, 2018). Work has also been 
conducted around social norms such as female genital mutilation and on potential problems with 
traditional structures in the North Eastern counties adjudicating in VAWG cases (Beston, 2018). 
Support was also given to the sub-county level Gender Technical Working Group, which took 
action on VAWG cases, including securing the arrest of perpetrators of an FGM/C (Beston, 
2018). 
Community policing and neighbourhood watch 
Community policing, neighbourhood watch schemes and other early warning 
mechanisms can be effective in improving levels of trust between communities and the 
police. Communities become a key part of front-line strategies to prevent violence in their own 
communities (Nolasco, 2017). Such civic-government partnerships can contribute to early 
warning systems or regular reports from community members about individuals seemingly at risk 
for extremist recruitment, for example, which can help reduce conflict and violent extremism. This 
has been particularly effective in Wajir in addressing disruptive communal shocks (Chome, 
2016). Further, members of community policing have managed to establish informal 
communication systems between authorities on either side of the Kenya-Somalia border (even 
when the Somalia side was under al-Shabaab control). They were able to secure the release of 
Kenyan teachers and non-governmental organisation (NGO) workers detained by al-Shabaab 
and accused of spying (USAID et al., 2013). They have also facilitated open discussions of police 
harassment and corruption during sessions on conflict prevention (USAID et al., 2013). Radio 
can be used to support community-police collaborative initiatives, helping to raise awareness 
about community-based programmes and how to become involved (Nolasco, 2017). 
Community Police Committees (CPCs), under the National Police Service, face various 
challenges, however, including issues with representation and risk. CPCs aim to bring 
together different segments of the community and the police regularly to identify community 
problems and coordinate responses (Beston, 2018). In areas where the police are not trusted, 
however, working with them can be a significant risk for community members. Respondents in 
parts of Wajir and Mandera, for example, say that CPC members fear for their lives because they 
are targeted as collaborators and spies (Beston, 2018). In addition, community respondents in 
several locations in the North East claim that CPCs need to be more inclusive and representative 
of the community and its interests (Beston, 2018).  
The Nyumba Kumi (ten houses) initiative, which anchors community policing at various 
levels – the household level, market, estate, among others, has demonstrated some 
success. Launched by the Kenyan government, it is a problem and solution-based system 
intended to create national security awareness amongst citizens and involve citizen participation 
from the grassroots level (Ndono et al., 2019; Nolasco, 2017). Each grouping is in charge of 
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addressing challenges specific to them, with the aim of providing more responsive and 
accountable security governance. The initiative seeks to work with different age and gender 
groups in order to determine their concerns and elicit their ideas (International Alert, 2016). The 
programme replaces prior forceful approaches with one that is based on trust, accountability and 
close relationships with the community to gain intelligence (Wakube et al., 2017). A study on the 
effectiveness of Nyumba Kumi in Garissa County finds that close collaboration of the community 
with security agencies has greatly improved and that that extremist attacks in the County have 
dropped significantly, even though some still occur (Wakube et al., 2017). Another study of 
Nyumba Kumi in Kayole, Nairobi County, finds that youth involvement helps to reduce crime and 
improve human security (Ndono et al., 2019). Their involvement can counter friction with elders 
and the view of youth as criminals. In addition, youth can keep tabs on each other, and ensure 
that those engaging in criminal activities are well checked (Ndono et al., 2019).  
There has been some overlap and confusion about the differences between CPCs and 
Nyumba Kumi, however, with reports of some individuals serving on both (Beston, 2018). 
While CPCs work with the police and Nyuma Kumi groups work for the national administration, 
attempts should be made to clarify their roles and identify opportunities to complement each 
other’s work (Beston, 2018). It is also important to ensure that such initiatives that involve civic-
government partnerships are not used for social profiling and community surveillance. 
Perceptions of such use would adversely affect trust between community and government 
officials (Chome, 2016). 
Countering violent extremism 
Kenya has since moved away from its securitised response to violent extremism, 
adopting a more ambitious counter initiative that extends beyond security, to attention to 
political and ideological rationales and the sense of nationhood (Nolasco, 2017). While the 
emphasis continues to focus on individuals, there is recognition of the need for a more holistic 
and integrated approach. This entails interventions aimed at addressing historical grievances and 
the environment conducive for violent ideologies and recruitment to extremism (Botha & Abdile, 
2020; ICG, 2018). Delivery of quality services, in particular education and health, and jobs within 
vulnerable communities, should comprise a large component of Countering violent extremism 
(CVE) efforts, as the lack of these can render youth particularly vulnerable to recruitment 
(Nolasco, 2017; Mkutu et al., 2014). Targeting, without stigmatising, young people, and providing 
them with alternative employment can disrupt al-Shabaab’s recruitment and diminish their appeal 
(ICG, 2018). 
Devolution has helped to undercut support for al-Shabaab as locally elected leaders are 
more likely to be trusted by local populations and to enjoy greater credibility with youths 
in addressing radicalisation and violent extremism than security officers posted from Nairobi 
(ICG, 2018; Mkutu et al., 2014). Counties also have a better understanding than the national 
government of the spread and distribution of unemployed youth and their vulnerability to 
recruitment (Mkutu et al., 2014). Counties thus have the potential to develop effective strategies 
and programmes which link these youth to training opportunities and potential employers (Mkutu 
et al., 2014). Garissa County, for example, has created scholarships scheme for technical 
courses, engineering and medicine. The county government has also popularised a motto of 
‘Ugatuzi na Kazi’ (devolution and work), which it has cascaded to the sub-counties, employing 
100 youth in every sub-county (Mkutu et al., 2014). 
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Efforts also need to be made to challenge particular perceptions of groups and treatment 
of all Muslims as terrorists or views of Christians as the enemy (Botha, 2013). Along these 
lines, authorities need to avoid blanket arrests and extrajudicial killings (ICG, 2018). In order to 
succeed, counter initiatives also need to be designed collectively with affected communities, 
ensuring that the voices of those who are often marginalised and excluded are heard (Botha & 
Abdile, 2020; Nolasco, 2017). With the aim of better integrating religious, ethnic and tribal 
minorities, promoting inter-faith harmony, and facilitating de-radicalisation, the government 
launched a National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism. The plan was launched in 2016 in 
coastal counties and in Wajir, Mandera and Garissa (Botha & Abdile, 2020; Chandra, 2019; 
NCIC, 2018). The plan includes training and capacity building for religious leaders, youth, women 
and government officials (NCIC, 2018). By increasing the knowledge and awareness of 
radicalisation processes amongst FBOs, local government and CBOs, a network of groups and 
individuals can be formed to help identify and quickly respond to such dynamics (Nolasco, 2017). 
Transitional justice 
Progress toward implementing the TJRC report and acknowledgement by political elites 
of past atrocities against the Somali population detailed in the report, could play a 
significant role in addressing historical injustices (Kirui, 2019; Nolasco, 2017). Such an 
acknowledgement, adopted with a view of taking responsibility, could help to rebuild trust and 
improve Kenyan Somali-Government of Kenya relations. This, in turn, could improve the 
prospect of greater national integration (Kirui, 2019). 
Investigation of the Wagalla massacre, and also the wider impact of the shifta war, formed 
a major element of the work of Kenya’s TJRC, however, lack of acknowledgement by state 
actors undermines the important findings of state culpability (Anderson, 2014). The TJRC 
determined findings of responsibility for the massacre of hundreds of civilians and other atrocities 
on the part of three state actors: the Wajir District Security Committee and the Provincial Security 
Committee (which authorised the violence); and the Kenya Army (for the actual execution) (see 
Anderson, 2014). The Commission also emphasised that the Kenyan state had created the 
political environment in which such an event could happen (Anderson, 2014). Failure of the 
agents of the state, especially the military, to acknowledge that the Wagalla massacre was a 
product of a state policy of violence, during TJRC hearings and subsequently, however, amounts 
to a failure to properly deal with the past (Anderson, 2014).  
Other actors have made efforts to achieve some form of acknowledgement, such as the 
unveiling of a public monument to the victims in 2014 (the 30th anniversary of the massacre), 
with the names of 482 of the victims engraved. This was supported by the Kenya National 
Commission for Human Rights, and assisted by the National Museums of Kenya, in conjunction 
with local and international partners (Anderson, 2014). 
The TJRC report, thus while commended for its robustness, has suffered from lack of 
implementation and lack of agreement on the part of political elites on how to proceed, 
which could contribute to a cycle of violence (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017; Nolasco, 2017). The 
non-implementation of the report thus remains a threat to peace in the country (Nolasco, 2017). 
Unaddressed historical injustices, in particular direct use of state power for violence against 
ethnic groups, are likely to continue to foster inter-group grievances (Cox et al., 2014). The lack 
of sustainable social reconciliation processes, and the manipulation of clan identities and 
stereotypes, has created an entrenched culture of retaliation in Mandera, for example, between 
the Garre and Degodia clans. Each episode of violent conflict leaves behind numerous 
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unresolved issues, which resurge and exacerbate the next conflict into a more severe (and often 
prolonged) contest, undermining the effectiveness of peacebuilding initiatives (NCIC & 
Interpeace, 2017). 
Peace committees 
Regional marginalisation and lack of trust in state institutions by communities in Northern 
Kenya mean that power has not necessarily resided in state institutions, but rather in a 
mix of actors adjacent to state institutions, such as traditional leaders, clan leaders and 
elders (Lind, 2018). These non-state actors and informal systems have not been in competition 
with formal structures for authority and power but rather executed the core functions of security 
and governance in places far from the centre (Lind, 2018). Recognising the importance of these 
non-state and informal actors to the functioning of political systems and peacebuilding at the 
margins, the central government has since the 1990s given them space to operate and treated 
them as partners. This began with a group of influential women peacebuilders in Wajir, who 
came together and successfully mediated between rival groups. This lead to the formalisation of 
civic-governmental collaboration through the formation of the WPDC in 1995 (Lind, 2018; 
Menkhaus, 2008). The marked decline in violent crime, including livestock raiding, in the North in 
the late 1990s – and the prevention or quick resolution of communal and cross-border clashes – 
is attributed to these coalitions of local non-state actors in partnership with the Kenyan state 
(Menkhaus, 2008). 
PCs have been prominent in historically marginalised peripheral border areas, playing a 
pivotal role in coordinating information and interventions to address conflict and serving 
as a mechanism for cooperation, trust and relationship building (USAID et al., 2013). The 
philosophy behind the establishment of PCs was derived from the need to institutionalise and 
legitimise traditional conflict resolution mechanisms; and to widen the constituency of traditional 
institutions to be more inclusive of gender and youth (Nolasco, 2017). Following the 2007-2008 
post-election violence, there was a growing recognition of the importance of PCs (Nolasco, 
2017). 
District PCs are vastly inclusive and have played a central role in managing ethno-political 
violence at the local level (Nolasco, 2017; Menkhaus, 2008). The WPDC gave social groups 
not normally given voice in formal government (e.g. elders, women, and youth) a central place in 
the civic-government collaboration. It also enabled cooperation among actors who may have 
previously been rival sources of non-state authority (e.g. traditional elders and business people 
and/or local NGO figures) (Menkhaus, 2008). Chaired by the District Commissioner, the WPDC 
included representatives from the District Security Committee, heads of government 
departments, NGOs, elders, women, youth, religious leaders, the business community, and the 
district’s four MPs (Menkhaus, 2008). The key success of the WPDC, and the partnerships it 
established, was the reduction of incidents of violent crime and banditry, and the facilitation of 
rapid, effective conflict management responses (Menkhaus, 2008). The WPDC also catalysed 
traditional clan elders within the Wajir District to form a robust ‘Council of Elders’, enabling them 
to engage in regular communication and collaboration (Menkhaus, 2008). The legitimacy and 
effectiveness of PCs, such as the WPDC, follows in large part from their homegrown, organic 
emergence; and their ability to be inclusive in a way that cuts across societal divisions (Hedditch, 
2016; USAID et al., 2013). In addition, its hybrid state-civic structure allows for local autonomy, 
along with the benefit of political support and coordination (Hedditch, 2016). Over time, the 
WPDC also received support from international donors (Menkhaus, 2008).  
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PCs can also spawn strong and beneficial spill-over effects, in which one successful PC 
is emulated in other districts and regions and across the border; and lessons are shared from 
one area to the next (Nolasco, 2017). Once established, the WPDC, for example, facilitated the 
establishment of other PCs, styled upon its own, along the border zone with their Somali 
counterparts, which contributed to an actual decline in cross-border conflicts (Hedditch, 2016). 
Such regional connectivity facilitated by the WPDC was, in turn, instrumental in the emergence of 
the Modogashe Declaration of 2001, concerned specifically with the peaceful settlement of 
regional disputes (see Hedditch, 2016). In the aftermath of the 2007-2008 post-election violence 
in Kenya, there has been growing recognition among government, civil society and development 
partners of the need to institutionalise traditional and community based peace structures such as 
District PCs (Nolasco, 2017).The National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management 
(2011) gave legal enforcement and official recognition to District PCs, which have become known 
as ‘County Peace Forums’ following devolution (Lind, 2018).  
There can also be spillover effects from the district to local level – and cooperation of 
sub-committees to effectively address cross-border conflicts. In Wajir, for example, the 
WPDC, along with other partners, have strengthened various local peace committees, which 
have then managed numerous inter-clan disputes over natural resource use (USAID et al., 
2013). Sub-county PCs that coordinate peacebuilding and conflict management in pastoral 
zones, incorporating traditional justice resolution mechanisms into the formal legal-judicial 
system, are highly regarded by members (Nolasco, 2017). The involvement of pastoralist 
associations in PCs can also help to address pastoralist conflict and competition for increasingly 
scarce water and pasture (Nolasco, 2017; USAID et al., 2013). A cross-border PC was 
established in 2018, for example, under the USAID’s PEACE III programme, to share early 
warning information, in order to help counter pastoral conflicts between Gare and Degodia clans. 
Strong PC-government relations can also contribute to the effectiveness of conflict reduction, by 
making pastoral communities well aware of the consequences of engaging in livestock theft and 
likely interception by authorities (Pact & Mercy Corps, 2018). 
Local PCs have also worked successfully with local administration authorities from 
Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia and Uganda, who routinely meet at the border to discuss 
conflicts and coordinate with state security forces in the areas (Nolasco, 2017; USAID et 
al., 2013). This collaboration as a whole has been credited with successfully addressing cross-
border conflict and reversing insecurity along the borders (Nolasco, 2017). Their success is 
attributed to: a good, functional relationship with government officials; strong local ownership; 
knowledge of local conflicts; commitment; flexible membership; and international financial 
support (Nolasco, 2017). PCs have been involved in coordinating rapid response interventions 
and have been supported under the USAID’s PEACE II programme to build up localised peace 
committees in strategic hotspot areas along the border (USAID et al., 2013). The programme has 
invested in strengthening PCs, supporting them to be more inclusive, to better coordinate across 
sectors and borders, and to link with the regional and national Conflict Early Warning and 
response mechanisms (USAID et al., 2013). 
While PCs have emerged as a proven, effective source of resilience, conflict management 
and peacebuilding in Kenya and neighbouring countries, they face various critiques and 
challenges, including the participation of women and inability to address root causes. 
Women in Northern Kenya have reported mixed experiences of being involved in PCs, with some 
suggesting that they were intentionally excluded from processes by not being told the correct 
time of meetings, or only included as a token to satisfy donor requirements (Wise et al., 2019). In 
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other cases, however, women respondents claim that their male counterparts support them and 
respect their opinion (Wise et al., 2019). It is important to be aware of these varying experiences 
to ensure that PCs are genuinely inclusive (Wise et al., 2019). Further, while PCs have been 
successful in reducing violent crime and in conflict management, they are often not in a position 
to prevent large-scale communal clashes nor to address the underlying causes of violent conflict 
(Menkhaus, 2008). 
PCs have also been undermined by divisive clan interests and by neglect by new county 
leaders under devolution. The effectiveness of PCs is based in large part on their 
independence and accountability (USAID et al., 2013). PCs have lost their effectiveness in 
situations where they have been utilised by clan leaders as a vehicle for pursuing their clan 
interests and/or where PC members have taken their own clan’s side in a conflict (or are strongly 
perceived to have done so). This undermines their role as a neutral peacebuilder (USAID et al., 
2013). Devolution has also inadvertently led to the side-lining of PCs and traditional peace pacts 
that have been effective sources of resilience. New county elites underutilise proven PCs and 
other community-based organisations (ICG, 2015). Intent on keeping the national government 
and neighbouring county jurisdictions at a distance and sidelining women and youth networks, 
they have preferred CPFs that are county-controlled mediation facilities (ICG, 2015). The WPDC, 
for example, has been weakened from lack of funding, purposeful neglect and transition to CPFs 
(Karienye & Warfa, 2020). 
The waning of DPCs and traditional peace pacts (such as the Modogashe Declaration) 
takes place in a context where new fields of political competition have emerged at the 
sub-national level (Lind, 2018). In relatively peaceful Wajir, upheld for its inclusive approach to 
county government, the experienced and successful ‘Al-Fatah Council of Elders’ has been 
superseded by the CPF (ICG, 2015). At the same time, governors, who are responsible for 
mobilising support for new CPFs, have often focused their energies instead on gaining greater 
security powers from the centre (Lind, 2018). The strength of CPFs ultimately will vary across the 
country, with some counties yet to constitute them, including Mandera, which has many other 
peace actors, committees and structures (Beston, 2018). There are some concerns that these 
county-controlled entities may adversely affect perceptions of neutrality on the part of parties to 
the conflict (ICG, 2015). 
Traditional elders and Council of Elders 
While traditional elders and CoEs have played an effective role in enforcing peace 
initiatives and agreements and managing conflict in Northern Kenya, there is debate 
about their continued utility (Nyamweru & Chidongo, 2018; Nolasco, 2017). The terms elders 
and Councils of Elders does not appear in the 2010 Constitution. Some scholars of African 
politics have suggested that these institutions are at odds with the ideals of modern democratic 
governance and will become increasingly less relevant, while others stress their continued 
relevance at the local level. They see them as continuing to provide affordable and easily 
accessible forms of alternative dispute resolution (Nyamweru & Chidongo, 2018). 
Traditional elders and CoEs have been effective in a number of places, although one of 
their key benefits may lie in providing an entry point for other actors to anchor 
infrastructures for peace. Examples of effective CoEs include the joint council established for 
the Mandera-Gedo region, and the elders of Garissa who led on the Lagdera dispute from the 
Garissa side while the famous Al Fatah council of elders from Wajir led from the Wajir side 
(USAID et al., 2013). Elders from conflicting communities have sealed treaties on peacekeeping 
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through traditional customs. This has not, however, necessarily prevented conflicts from flaring 
up again (Nolasco, 2017). Nonetheless, community elders can be one of the most important 
entry points through which other actors can anchor their local infrastructures for peace (NCIC, 
2018). The NCIC, for example, has relied on elders as entry points in facilitating dialogue in 
various counties, including in Garissa County (NCIC, 2018). The Commission uses dialogue 
extensively as a tool for achieving peace and reconciliation between and amongst communities, 
with mediation often accompanying dialogue efforts (NCIC, 2018). The Commission has trained 
over 500 CoE and Sub-County PCs in conflict transformation and facilitation of community 
dialogue, networking and early warning systems – and created platforms where CoE and 
government officials meet to discuss the implementation of community peace agreements (NCIC, 
2018). In recent years the Kenyan judiciary has also begun to explore ways of encouraging the 
use of local CoE in alternative dispute resolution, and both national and county governments are 
recognising the need to provide more financial and logistical support to these bodies (Nyamweru 
& Chidongo, 2018). 
CoEs have also been involved in pushing for greater involvement in the LAPSSET 
process in order to ensure that local concerns and interests are heard and accommodated 
(Cormack, 2016). Criticism of LAPSSET has not been about rejecting development, but about 
negotiating and claiming a stake in the process of development (Cormack, 2016). The revival 
and reinvention of the CoE, called dedha, which is a part of pastoralist heritage, is also a way of 
reclaiming control of the production of knowledge about the past and pastoralism (Cormack, 
2016). This can also serve to reconnect pastoralist and other minority groups of Northern Kenya 
(Cormack, 2016). For further discussion on LAPSSET, see Citizenship, social cohesion and 
diversity under Sources of Resilience. 
Elders and CoEs may represent larger descent groups, sub-clans and clans, with very few 
of Kenya’s CoE claiming an identity that transcends ethnicity, rendering them susceptible 
to clan politics. The National Council of Elders (of Kenya) is one of the few entities that 
transcends identity, comprising of all registered traditional councils of elders with the objective of 
peace, cohesion and integration for development (Nyamweru & Chidongo, 2018). While 
traditional elders retain extensive influence and authority in the Somali context generally, the 
proliferation of multiple clan elders allied with different politicians has eroded their influence. 
(USAID et al., 2013). In some parts of Mandera and Wajir, for example, some peace structures 
involving elders had been co-opted by politicians (Beston, 2018). CoEs were prominent in 
attempts to mobilise voters along ethnic and clan lines during the 2013 elections in Northern 
Kenya (Carrier & Kochore, 2014). Councils of each of the ethnic groups met to designate single 
candidates for the governorship (Scott-Villiers, 2017).  
In some places, strained relations between youth and community elders and neglect of 
women can undermine peace efforts. An accelerating generational gap may lead to the loss of 
knowledge of traditional peacemaking knowledge unless it is transferred, requiring more efforts 
to bridge the two generational groups (USAID et al., 2013). In addition, CoEs in Kenya have 
rarely supported a female candidate for any national position and have even intervened to 
discourage women from running (Nyabola, 2016). There are indications, however, that some 
local elder groups show signs of evolving to include younger people and women in their 
membership (Nyamweru & Chidongo, 2018). 
The resolution of disputes through traditional systems can offer quick justice and prevent 
retaliation, however, they can fail to address gender-based violence adequately. At the 
local community level, clans have been able to mitigate cases of crime, including cases involving 
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loss of life, through the maslaha reconciliation process (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017). Faster 
resolution through such alternative dispute mechanisms can prevent additional violence through 
retaliation or the escalation of conflict (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017). This system is often used in 
the case of sexual offences in rural areas and occasionally in urban areas, with village elders 
assessing financial compensation for the victims or their families. This can result in much less 
official reporting of such crimes and lack of clarity about prevalence, however, alongside the 
absence of criminal prosecutions (USDOS, 2019). 
Elders can play a role in addressing FGM/C. As discussed, a high percentage (82%) of 
respondents in a study on FGM/C practices in Kenya noted that tradition/custom was the main 
reason why people in their community practised FGM/C (Meroka-Mutua et al., 2020). A high 
proportion of respondents (85%) also strongly supported FGM/C abandonment programmes 
regardless of whether it was spearheaded by traditional community elders, government, or 
religious leaders (Meroka-Mutua et al., 2020). Elders, religious leaders and other community 
leaders can thus play important roles alongside government to create a platform to address 
issues related to FGM/C and to encourage bottom-up processes that encourage buy-in and 
compliance with formal laws that prohibit FGM/C (Meroka-Mutua et al., 2020). 
Religious leaders and inter-faith dialogue 
Customary and religious leaders continue to play a key role in influencing the attitudes 
and behaviours of communities, particularly remote, pastoral communities, benefitting 
from continued legitimacy and authority amongst such communities (Pact & Mercy Corps, 
2018). They are also perceived by members of the community as being impartial and above clan 
politics (USAID et al., 2013). Further, there are ways in which to address situations in which 
impartiality is in question. The Garissa Mediation Council, comprised of religious leaders and 
entities, for example, facilitated a dialogue among traditional clan elders to break the deadlock on 
a boundary dispute. During the process, however, the key religious leaders were not seen as 
impartial enough and the process was then led by third-party elders (for non-affected clans) 
(USAID et al., 2013). This flexibility in the leadership of peace processes demonstrates increased 
resilience and leadership in peacebuilding (USAID et al., 2013).  
Local religious leaders have successfully engaged in conflict mediation, leading to the 
development of permanent peace dialogue mechanisms, involved in addressing cross-
border conflict, violent extremism and VAWG. Local religious leaders successfully brokered 
the peaceful and unconditional release of non-local teachers from Mandera, for example, who 
had gone to buy merchandise from Belet Hawa, Somalia, in 2008 and were abducted (NCIC & 
Interpeace, 2017). This successful mediation led to the creation of a permanent peace dialogue 
mechanism between Kenya and Somalia, involving multi-stakeholders: the Mandera Mediation 
Council (MMC). The sheiks in MMC came from different clans, with existing skills in settling 
disputes. Since MMC’s successful intervention in the Garre-Murulle conflict in 2008 (with the 
support of PEACE II), the profile of religious actors have grown and they have formed a central 
part of subsequent conflict mediation efforts (USAID et al., 2013). The MMC has also been 
prominent in the cross border peace strategy team which enabled dialogue with al-Shabaab, 
which helped to avert the escalation of a number of disputes (USAID et al., 2013). More recently, 
the MMC has collaborated with the Violence against Women and Girls partner, Women for 
Peace and Development to enhance the gender element of their peace work (Beston, 2018). 
Mediation councils have thus enhanced the unity of religious leaders in undertaking 
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peacebuilding initiatives and improved their relationships with youth, women and the government 
(USAID et al., 2013). 
Strategies to counter violence and extremism include engaging more consistently with 
both Christian and Muslim religious leaders as a way to counter divisive narratives that 
fuel inter-communal tensions and to improve state-society and inter-community relations 
(International Alert, 2016). Inter-faith and intra-faith dialogues have been initiated, but they need 
to be increased and given more support (Nolasco, 2017). The government’s 2016 National 
Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism includes training and capacity building for religious 
leaders, youth, women and government officials to increase knowledge and awareness of 
radicalisation processes and how to respond (NCIC, 2018; Nolasco, 2017). 
While the involvement of religious leaders is often considered essential for successful 
CVE initiatives, they experience challenges for their own safety when engaging in CVE 
activities (Pact & Mercy Corps, 2018). Many religious leaders, despite their longstanding 
recognition as key agents for peace, have taken a back seat for fear of being perceived as terror 
suspects on suspicion of supporting al-Shabaab (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017). This, in turn, has 
impeded voluntary engagement in peace work, especially in fighting radicalisation (NCIC & 
Interpeace, 2017). It is important to foster relationships and networks among religious leaders 
and with other peace actors and security agencies such that religious leaders can safely carry 
out their roles (Pact & Mercy Corps, 2018). Most events that brought these actors together 
resulted in the development of some form of structure that would enable trusted, known leaders 
to keep working together. The Mandera action plan developed during an interfaith forum, for 
example, highlights the importance of developing a cross-border network of religious leaders 
from Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia who know and trust one another (Pact & Mercy Corps, 2018) 
Inter-faith dialogue should take place not only among religious leaders and their partners, 
but also at the community level and in the educational system. The lack of integration in the 
Kenyan educational system, whereby religious teaching is divided into Christian and Islamic 
studies, and students are grouped by religion, hinders inter-faith dialogue (Wesonga, 2017). 
Instead, children could benefit from inter-faith studies as part of their curriculum (Wesonga, 
2017). Initiatives of Change started an interfaith dialogue in 2016 at Garissa University, the site 
of the horrendous terror attack one year prior. The first dialogue attracted over 80 students, 
members of civil society, clergy from both Muslim and Christian faiths, as well as other members 
of the community. Discussion included teachings of harmony and coexistence from both the 
Bible and the Quran and outlined the roles of Muslims and Christians, among other community 
stakeholders. Students requested more dialogues to be held at to the university (IofC, 2018). 
Inter-faith dialogues and calls on the community to promote unity and to reject violence had 
already been taking place in Garissa County prior to the attack at the University, in response to 
prior violence in Garissa town in 2012 when the KDF burnt the market (Wakube et al., 2017). 
After the 2015 University attack, there was an immense wave of shared grief and horror, which 
had the effect of galvanising the religious groups to work together, contrary to the aim of al-
Shabaab (Wakube et al., 2017). 
Other inter-faith initiatives include the sharing of Christian and Muslim festivals and joint 
art projects to show unity (Wesonga, 2017). The Muslim community pushed to have Eid-ul-
Adha recognised as a public holiday, alongside Eid-il-Fitr, which was granted by the Kenyan 
government, helping to alleviate the perceptions of inequality or unfair treatment toward Islam 
(Wesonga, 2017). The painting of Mosques and Churches in the same colour in some parts of 
Nairobi, in order to show unity, has also brought different communities together (Wesonga, 
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2017). In order to gain sufficient traction, however, inter-faith initiatives, including dialogues, 
require ongoing support and resources (Nolasco, 2017). 
Media 
Kenya’s vibrant and dynamic media, with several community and faith-based radio 
stations with a fairly large following across the country, has the potential to contribute to 
conflict prevention and peacebuilding processes (Maweu, 2019). Radio remains the most 
powerful, accessible and affordable medium for reaching large numbers of people in isolated 
areas, building on the oral tradition of rural populations (Mercy Corps, 2019). Star FM, based in 
the North East of Kenya, is the country’s oldest Somali-language broadcaster and broadcasts 
throughout Kenya. USAID’s PEACE II programme has funded Star FM to hold live radio panel 
interviews with key peace actors in the North East, including religious leaders, and to broadcast 
peace dramas and interviews with the public (USAID et al., 2013). The radio dramas, in Somali, 
were very popular among the youth (USAID et al., 2013). Star FM also set up a hotline for 
citizens to share information on incidents of conflict across the region (USAID et al., 2013). The 
television and radio show, The Team in Kenya, developed in response to the 2007-2008 post-
election violence and co-produced by Search for Common Ground and Media Focus on Africa, 
dramatises key issues facing Kenyans. They include the need to move beyond tribalism, 
leadership, good governance, the roles and responsibilities of citizens, and the challenging 
relationship between elders and youth (Maweu, 2019). It has successfully reached millions of 
Kenyans with messages of peace and reconciliation (Maweu, 2019). The success of these 
various peace messages has been gauged through the lack of large-scale post-election violence 
in both 2013 and 2017, despite the fact that the root causes of post-election violence in 2007-08 
still remain largely unaddressed (Maweu, 2019). For further information on peace messaging, 
see Citizenship, social cohesion and diversity under Sources of Resilience. 
Community radio, which is considered closer to people at the grassroots level than 
mainstream broadcasts, can also be used to facilitate peaceful social dialogue and build 
trust and resilience between and among different communities in Kenya. This is due in part to 
their portrayal of promising potentials; and the promotion of dialogue and better understanding 
among conflicting communities (Maweu, 2019). Community radio can be a powerful 
peacebuilding tool, again through dramas, storytelling, and call-in talk shows (Maweu, 2019). The 
popular community radio drama, ‘Gutuka’ (a Kiswahili word meaning awaken), supported by the 
International Rescue Committee and USAID, disseminated messages of peace. It encouraged 
women to actively participate in the promotion of a peaceful society (Maweu, 2019). In Wajir 
County, which has experienced problems with drought and scarcity of water, community radio is 
relied upon to help better cope with the effects of climate change. Through radio talk shows and 
various messages broadcasted in local languages, Wajir Community Radio provides the 
community, particularly herders, with climate information. The radio also airs gender and natural 
resource management programming (Mercy Corps, 2019). It has become a trusted source of 
information for pastoralists and is well connected to local communities (Sladkova, 2019). It has 
also provided a platform for local communities to raise grievances and for policy-makers to take 
part in the dialogue (Sladkova, 2019). There is some limited evidence that the Radio improved 
the government’s accountability and made its relationships with local communities more 
collaborative (Sladkova, 2019). With donor support, the Radio was able to expand to other 
counties outside of Wajir, including Garissa, Isiolo and Mandera, reaching a larger audience that 
has also been affected by various disasters like droughts and floods (Mercy Corps, 2019).  
53 
Community-based media in Kenya face various challenges, however, in particular lack of 
funding and reliance on donors, inadequate professional training of journalists, and overreliance 
on volunteers (Maweu, 2019). Media organisations are also susceptible to political control and 
influence due in part to inadequate governance structures and lack of a defined identity (Maweu, 
2019). 
Business 
The dramatic expansion of cross-border commerce from Somalia into Kenya has had a 
variable effect on cross-border conflict, often serving as a force for cross-clan 
collaboration and security, but also producing conflict over control of key trade routes 
(Nolasco, 2017). Small but fast-growing towns, such as Mandera and Garissa, are centres of 
local and cross border commerce, linked to markets and production in Somalia and Ethiopia, 
(Menkhaus, 2015). Cross-border trade has produced a network of regional business elites whose 
partnerships span ethnic and national boundaries and whose interests in promoting either peace 
or conflict are essential for tracking conflict trends (Menkhaus, 2015). In Mandera County, many 
people confirmed that they have common business interests or investments across clan lines 
(NCIC & Interpeace, 2017). Communities on both sides of the Mandera County-Somalia border 
not only engage in cross-border trade, but also make use of one another’s services, including 
livestock markets, schools, health posts, and airstrips (Mohamed & Warfa, 2019). Such 
interdependence has at times helped people seek solutions that will halt conflicts that are likely to 
affect their commercial interests. Some people also jointly own or run properties with members of 
other clans and do not wish to see them destroyed in clan conflicts (NCIC & Interpeace, 2017). 
For discussion on how business people can instead fuel conflict, in particular, through the 
elimination of business rivals from other clans and engagement with al-Shabaab, see Conflict 
and resilience actors. 
Markets, such as livestock markets, are important shared spaces that bring different 
groups and communities within and across borders together, triggering the potential for 
conflict or resilience and peacebuilding. The Mandera livestock market, for example, brings 
together daily livestock traders from Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia. While disputes can arise in 
the marketplace that trigger wider communal conflicts, relationships can also be built and 
solidified, allowing for sharing of information, and crime and conflict prevention (USAID et al., 
2013). The Mandera District Livestock Marketing Council (DLMC) serves as a peace structure to 
resolve disputes arising between livestock traders as they conduct their business, collaborating 
closely with Mandera’s peace committees. Disputes in the market can trigger wider inter-
communal tensions and violence, thus market-based mediators need to be able to rapidly gather 
accurate information and resolve disputes before they escalate. A constant dialogue between 
livestock keepers mitigates such cross-border conflict, which can be triggered through livestock 
theft (USAID et al., 2013). The Mandera DLMC, in turn, has supported the formation of a Garissa 
Livestock Market Mediation Council, transferring good practice through training, exchange visits 
and facilitation (USAID et al., 2013). The DLMC action research team uncovered root causes of 
conflicts in Garissa Livestock Market, which include the lack of pricing regulations, and sources 
of potential cross-border conflict, including animal rustling, clan rivalry and drought (USAID et al., 
2013). The DLMC institution has moved beyond solely economic functions to act as a peace 
organisation with a strong early warning network among traders (USAID et al., 2013). 
Business can also serve to transform the characterisations and perceptions of 
marginalised populations, in particular the business success of Kenyan Somalis. The 
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large Somali community in Eastleigh, Nairobi, many of whom moved there from the North East of 
Kenya, have also been treated as outsiders, labelled as ‘terrorists’ and ‘illegal refugees’ and 
subjected to heavy-handed security raids (Varming, 2020). Their growing contribution to the 
business community, to the tax revenue of Nairobi City Council and to the general wealth and 
development of Kenya, however, has the potential to change discourses about them to new 
narratives of belonging and contribution (Varming, 2020). The business success of Kenyan 
Somalis can also evoke envy though from non-Somali Kenyans or fears that the former are 
taking over (Kirui, 2019). Somali Kenyans wish to contribute, but they also wish to be given the 
level of service and infrastructure in their communities to reflect their contributions (Varming, 
2020). Their business success can give them greater influence and clout in calling for improved 
services and equal treatment before the law, and can make them important, willing collaborators 
in peacebuilding efforts (Kirui, 2019).  
For further discussion, see Citizenship, social cohesion and diversity under Sources of 
Resilience.  
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